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Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992); The
Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992–93: Defining the “Equal
Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DETROIT C. L. REV. 953 (1994); On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th
Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997);
Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 391 (1997); Lowrey v. Texas A&M
University Systems: Title IX Vis-à-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation in Educational
Employment, 124 EDUC. L. REP. 753 (1998); The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and
Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 551 (2003); Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics Action Not Involving Sexual
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Tracing the History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases, 183 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2004);
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education: Supreme Court to Review Whether There is a Title IX
Cause of Action by an Athletic Department Employee for Retaliation, 194 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2005);
Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment Matters Involving Students in the Post-Davis Era, 206
EDUC. L. REP. 469 (2006); New Rules for the Game Mark the 35th Anniversary of Title IX Involving
Athletic Programs, 234 EDUC. L. REP. 515 (2008); Title IX Marks Its 35th Anniversary by Opening
the Doors to Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2008);
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee: The Supreme Court and the Axis of Section 1983, Title
IX and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Seeking Redress of Education-Related
Sexual Harassment, 246 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009); Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims Involving
Educational Athletic Department Employees and Student-Athletes in the Twenty-First Century, 8 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 223 (2009); The Entrenchment of the Glass Sneaker Ceiling: Excavating FortyFive Years of Gender Equity Involving Educational Athletic Employment Based on Title VII, Title IX
and the Equal Pay Act, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 429 (2011).

HECKMAN_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

462

5/9/2012 1:54 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

We don’t accomplish anything in this world alone, and whatever happens
is the result of the whole tapestry of one’s life and all the weavings of
individual threads from one to another that creates something.
- SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of federal civil rights laws were enacted during the latter part of
the Twentieth Century to prevent sex discrimination, including Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 19721 (Title IX), which prohibits such
discrimination in educational program and activities that receive federal funds.
The statute mandates that, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .”2 Thus, in exchange for the receipt of federal
funding, an educational institution agrees not to engage in discriminatory
activities as proscribed by the statute, regulations, and case law.3
One of the most contentious areas during Title IX’s history has been its
application to athletics programs, specifically involving intercollegiate and
interscholastic athletic programs.4 Historically, athletic departments were
1. Discrimination Based on Sex or Blindness, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2011). Title IX is also
referred to as the “Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act,” due to a 2002
resolution, signed by President George W. Bush. See H.R.J. Res. 113, 107th Cong. (2002) (honoring
the former member of the House of Representatives from Hawaii).
2. Id. § 1681(a).
3. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2011) (requiring an assurance of compliance, which was triggered in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)). See Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (describing the interaction as amounting
“essentially to a contract”). See also Diane Heckman, Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics
Action Not Involving Sexual Harassment?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175 (2003) [hereinafter
Heckman, Is Notice Required?] (focusing on whether the Gebser pre-litigation notice is required in
routine athletics’ gender equity cases—devoid of any sexual harassment claims, and arguing that it
would constitute the official policy of the particular educational institutions and thus fall within the
Court’s exception. The article first concentrates on purported sexual harassing actions taken by
educational employees, including athletic employees. It then addresses the traditional workings of
academic athletic departments and post-Gebser case law, while also mentioning Title IX’s
“contractual nature”). See infra text accompanying notes 166–67 (indicating then Judge John G.
Roberts’ description of this as a “bargain.”).
4. Diane Heckman, New Rules for the Game Mark the 35th Anniversary of Title IX Involving
Athletic Programs, 234 EDUC. L. REP. 515, 516 (2008) [hereinafter Heckman, New Rules for the
Game]. See Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving
Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551
(2003) [hereinafter Heckman, The Glass Sneaker] (the article starts out with the wonderful quote
from renowned author, Pearl S. Buck, “The basic discovery about any people is the discovery of the
relationship between its men and its women.” Id. at 551. It then explores the statute concerning
physical education classes, interscholastic and intercollegiate student-athletes, athletic scholarships,
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segregated based on the sex of the students. Even though the statutory
language was devoid of any mention of either sports or athletics, the 1975
Title IX regulations would cover “athletics,”5 and allow for separate male and
female teams in certain situations,6 and require “equal opportunity” when
separate athletic programs were provided for male and female studentathletes.7
This Article looks at the Supreme Court’s interaction with Title IX over its
forty-year history, including the activities of the members of the Rehnquist
Court and the new Roberts Court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first
female Justice of the Supreme Court, announced her retirement during July
2005. This led to President George W. Bush making his first Supreme Court
nomination of circuit court Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., a relatively new
member of the District of Columbia Circuit Court, for the prestigious position.
A mere two months later, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who had been in
poor health, died. This resulted in President Bush altering the nomination of
Judge Roberts from the Associate Justice position to that of Chief Justice. The
Article focuses on testimony from the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s
confirmation hearings addressing the nomination of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.
for the position of Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The situation was
unique in that there has never been such an expansive dialogue concerning a
Supreme Court nominee over his or her views concerning this gender equity
statute. Due to Title IX’s public association with sports, it was fascinating that
Judge Roberts, in his opening remarks, chose a sports metaphor in describing
his role as a judge to that of an umpire.8
During Title IX’s tenure, there have been a number of contested items
regarding the law’s application. Pivotal issues concerned the jurisdictional
aspects of Title IX and the remedies that may be afforded to potential litigants
and athletic employment); Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th Anniversary: Sex
Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Sex
Discrimination in the Gym] (this comprehensive article provides a blueprint of the major areas of
Title IX’s application, including education generally, extracurricular athletic activities, employment
and sexual harassment); Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year
History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics,7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
391 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard] (accessible article, with mosaic-like entries to glean
the history of Title IX); Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title
IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Heckman, Women & Athletics] (this
foundation article still stands up and provides a wealth of information about Title IX).
5. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41.
6. Id. § 106.41(b).
7. Id. § 106.41(c).
8. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing]; Heckman, New Rules for the Game, supra note 4, at 515.
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who seek redress for violations of the statute. Justice Roberts was involved
with certain landmark Title IX litigation while working as both a government
and private attorney.9 Part II provides an overview of the Title IX issues that
the Supreme Court has confronted. It addresses the Rehnquist Court lineup;
the substantive Title IX Supreme Court decisions issued; the retirement of the
center fielder, Justice O’Connor; and the installation of the new players on the
team, Chief Justice Roberts, Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. and
Associate Justice Sonya Sotomayor—all former Circuit Court of Appeals
jurists—and Associate Justice Elena Kagan, the only current member without
prior experience as a jurist. Part III investigates the critical issue of what
remedies may be available for a Title IX claim. Part IV excavates the
bellwether issue of what constitutes the receipt of federal funds to engender
oversight of the statute by educational programs and activities. Part V looks at
whether athletic associations are governed by this statute. Part VI provides a
postscript. The Appendix contains a table summarizing the Supreme Court
opinions that targeted Title IX. Woven throughout this presentation is an
examination of Judge Roberts’ remarks presented during his Senate
confirmation hearings.
II. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: “TAKE ME OUT TO THE BALL GAME”10
A. The Rehnquist Lineup
1972 marked Title IX’s enactment, as well as the commencement of the
judicial career of William Rehnquist, when President Richard M. Nixon
nominated him to the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice. In 1986,
President Ronald Reagan then selected Justice Rehnquist to be the Chief
Justice. The Rehnquist Court featured: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and according
to seniority, Associate Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Steven Breyer. Despite being on the bench for over
thirty years, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not author any of the Title IX
majority opinions. The time of the burgeoning awareness of Title IX also
coincided with the tenure of Justice O’Connor, the first female Justice on the
U.S. Supreme Court (September 22, 1981–January 31, 2006).11 Justice
9. As an attorney, Mr. Roberts successfully represented the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) in the Title IX appeal before the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S.
459 (1999) (discussed within). See infra text accompanying notes 166–67, concerning the nominee’s
description of the case.
10. JACK NORWORTH & ALBERT VON TILZER, Take Me Out to the Ball Game (1908).
11. O’Connor became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court coinciding with the 1981 term
through January 2006, when her successor was sworn in as a member of the Court.
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O’Connor authored the most Title IX opinions rendered by the Court—three12
of the eight Title IX challenges13—and from a Title IX perspective, was
literally the keeper of the flame. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (August 3,
1993–present) authored one opinion.14 Thus, the two female jurists accounted
for fifty percent of the governing Title IX opinions.15 President George H.W.
Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement
of Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Thomas was a former head of the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), a division within the U.S. Department of
Education that handles oversight of a number of civil rights statutes that
impact upon education, including administratively overseeing Title IX sex
discrimination concerns. His nomination to the Court would be stung by
claims of purported inappropriate actions toward a female employee during his
government employment.16
12. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (examining Title IX peer sexual harassment); Gebser, 524 U.S. 274
(examining Title IX teacher-student sexual harassment).
13. See Jackson, 544 U.S. 167; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. See also Smith, 525
U.S. 459; Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555
(1984); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677
(1979). See infra Appendix Table 1. Summary of Pre-Roberts Court’s Title IX decisions.
14. Smith, 525 U.S. 459. See Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender
Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 699 (1998).
15. Diane Heckman, Title IX Marks Its 35th Anniversary by Opening the Doors to Single-Sex
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2008).
16. See Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 36–40
(1991) (testimony of Anita Hill); KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT:
THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2007) [hereinafter SUPREME DISCOMFORT]; Adam
Cohen, The Next Big Thing in Law? The Harsh Jurisprudence of Justice Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2007, § 4, at 13.
In the last 100 Supreme Court arguments, Clarence Thomas has not uttered a word. . . .
They offer a wealth of insight, but they have no answer to the central enigma he poses:
why the justice who has faced the greatest hardships regularly rules for the powerful over
the weak, and has a legal philosophy notable for its indifference to suffering.

Id. (referring to SUPREME DISCOMFORT, the 2007 biography on Justice Thomas). See also JEFFREY
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007) (focusing
principally on the actions of the Rehnquist Court) (“Thomas’s confirmation hearings, of course,
turned into a . . . carnival of accusation and counterclaim between the nominee and his one-time aide
Anita Hill.” Id. at 21.
Hill had been a young lawyer on Thomas’s staff, first at the Department of Education and
then at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. During those years, she had
confided to friends that her boss had made a series of bizarre sexual comments and
overtures to her. . . . Thomas rejected Hill’s allegations of mistreatment, but otherwise
refused to answer any questions about his relationship with Hill or his personal life.

Id. at 27).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist ushered in the Rehnquist Revolution, finding that
a number of congressional statutes were unconstitutional acts of usurpation by
the legislative branch, by transgressing initially the Commerce Clause,17
followed by infringement of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.18 This amendment embedded the principle of federalism, and
specifically, the rights of the states to be free from having to defend
themselves in federal courts concerning allegations of violating federal statutes
in a lawsuit brought by citizens. Whether an individual can sue a state or arm
of a state in federal court, without transgressing the Eleventh Amendment, is
an issue that has come to the forefront in all federal civil-rights-based
litigation.19 This would include Title IX, as the statute can apply to state
colleges and universities, as well as public elementary and secondary
schools—leaving these educational institutions potentially targeted. Thus,
“[t]he stance by the recent two Supreme Court nominees on the power of
Congress . . . vis-à-vis the Eleventh Amendment was a topic of intense interest
by the Senators on the Judiciary Committee, who interviewed then Judges . . .
Roberts and . . . Alito.”20
After switching the original nomination of Judge Roberts to fill Justice
O’Connor’s seat to that of Chief Justice, President Bush then nominated Judge
Alito, from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for her position. This occurred
during the end of 2005, after President Bush’s counsel, Harriet E. Miers,
withdrew her name from consideration for the position. Justice Alito was
sworn in on January 31, 2006, and attended President Bush’s 2006 State of the
Union address that evening at the Capitol building. When the senators on the
Judiciary Committee questioned then-Judge Alito, their concerns with him did
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Supreme
Court, in a divided opinion, found the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34,
did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity to allow state employees to commence private
lawsuits in federal courts seeking remedies against certain state entities, including the Alabama State
University and Florida State University, based on the federal law); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567–68 (1995).
19. See generally Diane Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment on the Civil Rights of
Disabled Educational Employees, Students and Student-Athletes, 227 EDUC. L. REP. 19 (2008)
[hereinafter Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment]. While a case-by-case inquiry must
be made in general, state universities are deemed “arms of the State” to come under the Eleventh
Amendment definition; whereas K–12 public schools are not deemed “arms of the State.” Id. at 29–
33 (discussing whether defendants would be cocooned).
20. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 388–89 (2006) [hereinafter Alito’s Confirmation Hearing]. See infra text accompanying note
161 (presenting a portion of the transcript); Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 19, at 26. See also Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8.
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not target Title IX case law.21 There were no changes to the composition of
the members of the Judiciary Committee, who conducted the January 2006
Alito Confirmation Hearing, since its earlier inquest of Judge Roberts.
Title IX allows litigants to bring private causes of action against public
educational institutions. Although Title IX was purportedly enacted pursuant
to the Spending Powers,22 on October 21, 1986, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act (Equalization Act), which specifically
directs, “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation
of . . . [T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 . . . .” 23 The
Equalization Act has presently provided armor to protect Title IX from judicial
cannibalism concerning the Eleventh Amendment.24 Thus, Title IX has not
been hampered from a Supreme Court ruling insulating public schools,25 with
the Court substantively interpreting the statute in three recent post-Seminole
Tribe cases,26 with one passing reference to the Eleventh Amendment.27
Albeit, all of the Title IX cases were brought against public school districts,
21. Id.; Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at 1, 18 (indicating “But only one change—Justice Alito’s replacement of
Justice O’Connor—really mattered. That move defines the Roberts court.”) [hereinafter Liptak, The
Most Conservative Court in Decades]. See infra text accompanying notes 161–62.
22. See Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 192 (referencing Gebser, 524 U.S. at
287). See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (1992) (“Moreover, the notion that Spending Clause statutes do
not authorize monetary awards for intentional violations is belied by the unanimous holding in
Darrone.” (referring to Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984))). The
accompanying footnote alerted, “Because we conclude that a money damages remedy is available
under Title IX for an intentional violation irrespective of the constitutional source of Congress’ power
to enact the statute, we need not decide which power Congress utilized in enacting Title IX.” Id. at 75
n.8).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2011).
24. Albeit, the Supreme Court has determined that this express provision within or attached to a
specific piece of federal legislation will no longer solely equate with constituting a satisfactory legal
abrogation. The federal statute must now have an appropriate Fourteenth Amendment nexus. See
Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 27.
25. Earlier, in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico district court ruled that the
state university was insulated from a Title IX monetary damages claim in a sexual harassment case
brought by a female medical student and employee, but not from her claim for injunctive relief. 745
F. Supp. 793 (D.P.R. 1990), rev’d, 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988). See also Litman v. George
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 1999) (proffering, “As a general proposition, therefore,
when Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, there is no categorical prohibition against its
attaching conditions to grants made to the states.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); Franks v. Ky.
Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998) (concerning a sexual harassment claim brought by
female student). See Diane Heckman, Title IX Tapestry: Threshold and Procedural Issues, 153
EDUC. L. REP. 849, 856–57 n.61, 858–59 (2001) [hereinafter Heckman, Title IX Tapestry] (listing
and discussing other cases).
26. See Jackson, 544 U.S. 167; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
27. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
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traditionally not deemed arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment
application, as opposed to state universities. The federal courts are allowing
such federal litigation to take place for those seeking Title IX redress
(including monetary damages)—finding that the receipt of the federal funds
provides the implicit waiver of the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
protection.28 In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme
Court, in allowing for all traditional remedies when pursuing a Title IX cause
of action, stated:
Our reading of the two amendments to Title IX enacted after
Cannon leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend to
limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX.
In the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, . . . 42 U.S.C.
§2000d-7, Congress abrogated the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of
1975. . . . In addition to the Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1986, Congress also enacted the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 [(1988)]. Without
in any way altering the existing rights of action and the
corresponding remedies permissible under Title IX, Title VI,
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination
Act, Congress broadened the coverage of these
antidiscrimination provisions in this legislation.29
Presently, no defendants have successfully asserted the Eleventh
Amendment to shield them from Title IX lawsuits. Currently, “[i]t remains to
be seen whether the Roberts Court will maintain the status quo exhibited by
his predecessor and mentor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, or move in another
direction concerning Congress’s legislative authority.”30
28. See, e.g., Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (sexual harassment claim by
female student against male professor); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000)
(addressing an intercollegiate athletics sports teams offered to female students); Litman, 186 F.3d 544
(expelled female student unsuccessfully charged retaliation for advancing unsubstantiated sexual
harassment against a male professor; the case discussed Title IX’s abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
29. 503 U.S. at 72–73.
30. Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 26. See also William E.
Thro, An Essay: The Roberts Court at Dawn: Clarity, Humility, and the Future of Education Law,
222 EDUC. L. REP. 491, 491–92 (2007), noting the differences between the Rehnquist Court and the
newer Roberts Court, id. at 491–92, and opining, “Consequently, the Roberts Court practices judicial
restraint. In place of ambiguous decisions that reflect a middle course but provide little guidance, the
Roberts Court provides a clarity that provides needed guidance and, ultimately, limits the judicial
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B. Title IX Pre-Roberts Supreme Court Decisions
Title IX was enacted on June 23, 1972. In the intervening forty years, the
Supreme Court has rendered eight substantive decisions concerning Title IX.
Table I of the Appendix contains a summary of each opinion to provide a
context for the new Roberts Court.
1. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court ruled a student was
entitled to assert a private cause of action alleging Title IX. Specifically, a
female medical student commenced this lawsuit concerning her expulsion
from the medical school, which she alleged was due to her sex.31 The statute
was silent on this significant aspect.32 This decision set the stage for plaintiffs
to pursue relief for purported sex discrimination through the courts, rather than
having to rely primarily on administrative hearings handled by the OCR.
2. In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 33 the Court upheld the
power of the lower courts.” Id. at 492. But see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.,
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Fourteenth Amendment case concerning use of race), where the author
recognizes the numerous opinions rendered by the Justices, stating, “there is some confusion
regarding what is and is not the Court’s ruling.” Thro, supra note 30, at 493 n.16. The same criticism
could be made concerning the Roberts Court’s output in Morse v. Frederick, with its myriad decisions
concerning First Amendment free speech rights of public school students who express verbiage for
the illegal use of drugs, which was de jure extrapolated from the high school senior’s unfurled banner,
with the words, “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” 551 U.S. 393 (2007). Thro argues the Morse case “does
provide a bright-line rule in a small, but important, area.” Thro, supra note 30, at 497. It remains to
be seen whether the Morse opinion will result in expanded restriction of students’ free speech rights
when also speaking out about other illegal activities, without a political or advocacy patina. See, e.g.,
Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007) (dealing with First Amendment
student free speech case involving a putative threat of a Columbine-type of violence at his school,
which relied on a concurrence rendered by Justice Alito from the Morse case). See Diane Heckman,
Just Kidding: K-12 Students, Threats and First Amendment Freedom of Speech Protection, 259
EDUC. L. REP. 381, 400 (2010) (discussing the Ponce case in depth).
31. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677. See Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (D.
Minn. 2007) (expounding upon the Cannon opinion, as to whether Title IX allows a private cause of
action against the U.S. Department of Education, and determining that, “In fact, the Supreme Court
did acknowledge that private lawsuits against federal funding agencies had previously been allowed
under Title VI and explained that such cases ‘are . . . consistent, at least, with the widely accepted
assumption that Title VI creates a private cause of action.’” This court indicated, “There is no
binding precedent deciding whether a private right of action against a federal funding agency exists
under Title IX.” Id. The court ultimately determined “that a private right of action against federal
funding agencies exists when the funding agency itself is accused of acting to violate Title IX and
foster discrimination.” Id. at 1054).
32. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88.
33. N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. 512. See Diane Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board
of Education: Supreme Court to Review Whether There is a Title IX Cause of Action by an Athletic
Department Employee for Retaliation, 194 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter Heckman,
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education] (The commentary informed, “Whether Title VII trumps
Title IX in employment-related sex discrimination cases remains a significant issue owing to the
favorable aspects of Title IX compared with Title VII.” Id. at 5 (referring to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e [hereinafter Title VII]). The article concludes, “To leave a
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constitutionality of the Title IX regulations governing employment (Subpart
E),34 brought by a public school board against the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the predecessor agency of the
U.S. Department of Education, which came into existence in 1980. After the
expansive Title IX regulations were enacted in 1975,35 Congress had an
opportunity to reject their adoption, but neglected to do so. In a subsequent
opinion, the Court would later comment, “Congress’ failure to disapprove the
[Title IX] regulations is not dispositive, but, as we recognized in North
Haven . . ., it strongly implies that the regulations accurately reflect
congressional intent.”36 Presently, the Supreme Court has never invalidated
any of the Title IX regulations.
3. In Grove City College v. Bell,37 the divided Court imposed a narrow
determination adopting that the specific program or activity must receive
federal funds in order for Title IX to apply.38 In this case, there was no
evidence of any gender discrimination at this private, independent
Pennsylvania college. Instead, the college refused to enter into a written
“Assurance of Compliance,” as warranted by the regulations.39 While the
college itself received no direct federal funding, some of its students received
Basic Education Opportunity Grant (BEOG) awards, federal money that went
coach unprotected from asserting a Title IX retaliation claim seems antithetical to the purpose and
spirit of the law.” Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, supra, at 33. The Supreme
Court essentially agreed in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005)).
34. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51–106.61.
35. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1975). See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 4, at 12–13.
36. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 568.
37. Id. at 555. There were multiple opinions filed, including a separate concurrence issued by
Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor. Id. at 576. The latter opinion agreed with
the holding, but did so
reluctantly and [was written] briefly to record my view that the case is an unedifying
example of overzealousness on the part of the Federal Government. . . . It was and is the
policy of this small college to remain wholly independent of government assistance,
recognizing—as this case well illustrates—that with acceptance of such assistance one
surrenders a certain measure of the freedom that Americans always have cherished. . . .
One would have thought that the Department [of Education], confronted as it is with cases
of national importance that involve actual discrimination, would have respected the
independence and admirable record of this College.

Id. at 576–77.
The Court rejected the institution-wide coverage argument. Id. at 573. See Heckman, Women &
Athletics, supra note 4, at 30–31.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4. “When Grove City persisted in refusing to execute an Assurance, the
Department [of Education] initiated proceedings to declare the College and its students ineligible to
receive [Basic Educational Opportunity Grants].” Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 561.
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toward the students’ tuition at the universities and colleges. The Court stated,
“[w]e conclude, therefore, that the Department [of Education] may properly
condition federal financial assistance on the recipient’s assurance that it will
conduct the aided program or activity in accordance with Title IX and the
applicable regulations.”40 Even though armed with that determination,
however, the practical effect of this case was that the Court’s ruling extended
Title IX’s application merely to the college’s financial affairs office, which
actually received the funding for athletic and academic scholarships and grants
as this was the only department within the college that directly received
federal funds. There was no trickle out or leakage effect imposed by the
country’s highest court based on the contention: that simply because an
educational institution received federal funds, this would subject the whole
school and by implication all of its parts to comply with Title IX dictates.
Congress disagreed with this cramped judicial interpretation that had been
sanctioned by the Reagan administration. Four years later, President Ronald
Reagan vetoed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1988 Amendments)
(Restoration Act), intended to repair the damage done by the Court’s decision,
by utilizing a broad definition for what constituted an educational program or
activity. 41 However, on March 22, 1988, Congress legislatively overturned
the Court’s opinion, after overriding the presidential veto. The Restoration
Act would be the only major change to the statute in the intervening forty
years. Its impact was significant as it opened the doors for litigants to ensure
that extracurricular athletic programs provide equal opportunity, especially for
female students and prospective female student-athletes.42
4. During 1992, in Franklin,43 the Court sanctioned a damages remedy for
40. Id. at 575.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1687, Pub. L. 100–259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) states:
For the purposes of this title, the term “program or activity” and “program” mean all of
the operations of . . . a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education; or . . . a local educational agency . . . system of vocational
education, or other school system . . . except that such term does not include any operation
of an entity which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of section
901 [20 U.S.C. § 1681] to such operation would not be consistent with the religious tenets
of such organization.

President Reagan, in a speech given on March 22, 1988, stated, “The Grove City bill would force
court-ordered social engineers into every corner of American society. I won’t cave to the
demagoguery of those who cloak a big government power grab in the mantle of civil rights.” EQUAL
PLAY: TITLE IX AND SOCIAL CHANGE 102 (Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2007)
[hereinafter EQUAL PLAY]. The prognostication has failed to materialize in the intervening period.
42. See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics
During 1992–93: Defining the “Equal Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DETROIT C. L. REV. 953
(1994).
43. Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 (Justice White authored the opinion, joined in Justices Blackmun,
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a Title IX sexual harassment action involving a “female student . . . against the
school board for the action of a male teacher, who was incidentally a coach of
one of the boys’ [interscholastic athletic] teams.”44 The Court described the
school employee as “a sports coach and teacher.”45 The Court, in adopting a
broad view of the statute, stated, “[w]e cannot say, therefore, that Congress
has limited the remedies available to a complainant in a suit brought under
Title IX.”46 The decision was instrumental in utilizing this civil rights statute
to ensure eradication of sex discrimination within the schoolhouse doors,
especially sexual harassment claims.
5. On June 22, 1998, the Court rendered its opinion in Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District, involving a female high school freshman
student’s claim of sexual harassment against a Texas public school district,
based on the actions of a fifty-year-old male teacher.47 The highest court
agreed to hear an appeal from the Fifth Circuit concerning what standard, if
any, should be applied to determine the Title IX liability of an educational
institution involving the alleged harassing actions of a (male) teacher toward a
(female) student. The Title IX statute and implementing regulations,48 as well
as the earlier Franklin decision, shed no verbiage on what standard should be
applied—thus, leading to the use of dissimilar standards by the lower courts,
including a strict liability standard, an agency standard, a Title VI standard and
a Title VII hostile environment standard—so the issue was clearly ripe for
review.49 The Court determined “that damages may not be recovered in those
circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has
authority to institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual
notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.”50
6. In NCAA v. Smith, a female graduate student challenged the practices
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter. Justice Scalia submitted a concurring opinion, joined in by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Thomas).
44. Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 179. See also Heckman, Scoreboard, supra
note 4, at 406.
45. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63.
46. Id. at 73.
47. Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (5–4) (The majority consisted of Justices O’Connor (author), Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas; the dissent featured Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). See Diane Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment
Matters Involving Students and Student-Athletes in the Post-Davis Era, 206 EDUC. L. REP. 469, 471–
72 (2006) [hereinafter, Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment] (discussing the
opinion in detail); Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 191–96.
48. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1997).
49. See Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 180–81.
50. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
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of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the most important
collegiate athletic association.51 When an athlete transfers from one school to
another, athletic associations generally impose a one-year transfer rule,
whereby the athlete would not be able to play for the new school for one year
following the transfer. Student-athletes seek to avoid that penalty by seeking
waivers of the rule. After a transfer from one college to another, Smith
wanted to continue to be eligible to play volleyball. She argued that the
NCAA granted more waivers for eligibility for males versus female studentathletes to allow them to validly participate on collegiate athletic teams. The
Court found a lack of jurisdiction over the NCAA, as it would not imbue the
athletic association’s receipt of federal funds, a necessary prima facie element,
due to the fact that most—if not all—of its member colleges and universities
were recipients of federal funds. The Court essentially eschewed a trickle
down effect to bring an entity within Title IX’s coverage.
7. In 1999, the Court rendered its fractured decision in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,52 finding that Title IX allowed a cause of action
against a public school district based on peer sexual harassment.53
8. In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court condoned the
ability of a (male) former coach of a girls’ high school interscholastic
basketball team to assert his retaliation claim, pursuant to Title IX, for the
alleged imposition of an adverse employment action against him for speaking
out about claimed inequities faced by the female student-athletes at the
Alabama high school where he worked.54 The coach, who was also a teacher,
started receiving negative evaluations for his coaching after expressing his
viewpoint as to the inequitable conditions his athletes experienced, and he was
ultimately removed as coach. Justice O’Connor noted that the Court agreed to
hear this appeal to resolve a disagreement among the circuit courts.55 The
51. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (Judge Alito did not participate in the underlying Third Circuit opinion).
See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 4, at 569–70.
52. Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (5–4) (The majority consisted of Justices O’Connor (author), Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas; the dissent comprised Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer). See Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment, supra note
47, at 472–74; Diane Heckman, Tracing the History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases,
183 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 12–15 (2004) [hereinafter Heckman, Peer Sexual Harassment]; Heckman, Is
Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 196.
53. See Heckman, Peer Sexual Harassment, supra note 52, at 12–15.
54. Jackson, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (5–4) (The majority consisted of Justice O’Connor (author),
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas; the dissent comprised Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer). See Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,
supra note 33.
55. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172–73 (citing Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242 (5th
Cir. 1997) and Preston v. Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994)). See
Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, supra note 33, at 9–12, 14 (discussing the
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Court underscored that it has allowed Title IX sexual harassment claims
despite lack of explicit language56 and would also allow retaliation claims
despite the lack of explicit language in the statute. Parenthetically, the Title
IX regulations did refer to retaliation.57 Specifically, the Court enunciated,
“[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and
would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report [such retaliation]
went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s
enforcement scheme would unravel.”58 Justice O’Connor explained, “Title
IX’s enforcement scheme also depends on individual reporting because
individuals and agencies may not bring suit under the statute unless the
recipient has received ‘actual notice’ of the discrimination.”59 The majority
adduced, “[m]oreover, teachers and coaches such as [this coach of the girls’
basketball team] are often in the best position to vindicate the rights of their
students because they are better able to identify discrimination and bring it to
the attention of administrators.”60 The Court held, “[t]he statute is broadly
worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation also be the victim
of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint. Where the
retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex
discrimination, [the statutory language] ‘on the basis of sex’ . . . is satisfied.”61
C. The Legacy of the Center Fielder, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
In profiling the significance of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
commentator Jeffrey Toobin ascribed,
[o]n race, sex, religion, and the power of the federal
government, the subjects that produced the enduring
controversies, control of the Court generally belonged to the
moderate swing justices, first Lewis F. Powell and then
Lowrey case; also citing Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., 39 F. App’x 748 (3d Cir. 2002)
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1047 (2002); Weaver v. Ohio State Univ., 194 F.3d
1315 (6th Cir. 1999); Musso v. Univ. of Minn., 105 F.3d 409 (8th Cir. 1997). The author opined,
“Coaches are pivotal due to the repository of knowledge they possess about the factors involving their
student- athletes and how the gender equity offered them compares with that afforded members of
other teams within a particular school.”), 18–19 (discussing Preston); Diane Heckman, Lowrey v.
Texas A&M University Systems: Title IX Vis-a-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation in
Educational Employment, 124 EDUC. L. REP. 753 (1998).
56. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173.
57. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71.
58. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180.
59. Id. at 181.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 179.
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Sandra Day O’Connor, who steered the Court in line with
their own cautious instincts—which were remarkably similar
to those of the American people.62
He summarized the role of Justice O’Connor, noting:
[t]hese decisions—the legacy of the Rehnquist Court—came
about largely because for O’Connor there was little difference
between a judicial and a political philosophy. She had an
uncanny ear for American public opinion, and she kept her
rulings closely tethered to what most people wanted or at least
would accept. No one ever pursued centrism and moderation,
those passionless creeds, with greater passion than O’Connor.
No justice ever succeeded more in putting her stamp on the
law.63
Justice O’Connor’s legacy in the area of Title IX is apparent based on her
decisions, ascribing that Title IX will cover sexual harassment actions against
the educational institutions, whether the particular offending actors involved
school employees or fellow students.64 She also captured the spirit of the Title
IX paradigm by dictating that retaliation actions are a logical and appropriate
basis for a lawsuit in order to effectuate the underlying goals of Title IX.65
The standards Justice O’Connor authored will have a far-reaching impact
on the students in this country. While the jurist allowed for sexual harassment
to be a potential subset within the Title IX scheme, she imposed strict
standards to meet to be able to go forward. Justice O’Connor predicated the
standards principally upon the notice element—unless it is the official policy
of the educational institution, in which case notice would not be required.
Thus, as to the former situation, if the educational institution has notice of the
offensive actions of their employees or students and essentially takes no good
faith action to end or ameliorate the situation, then the school can be held
responsible. However, if the school does not have notice or knowledge of the
situation, it prevents the entity from having the opportunity to take action, and
62. TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 2. He continued, “Few associate justices in history dominated a
time so thoroughly or cast as many deciding votes as O’Connor—on important issues ranging from
abortion to affirmative action, from executive war powers to the election of a president.” Id. at 7. See
also Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, supra note 21, at 18 (indicating, “Until she
retired in 2006, Justice O’Connor was very often the court’s swing vote, and in her later years she had
drifted to the center-left.”).
63. TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 7–8.
64. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
65. See Jackson, 544 U.S. 167.
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thus, the entity should be shielded from the imposition of civil liability and the
diminution of its treasuries for actions by their employees clearly not within
the normal course of business.
In the usual employment situation, respondeat superior prevails as the
legal theory for personal injury actions to hold the employer liable for the
actions of their employees undertaken in the normal course of business.
Herein, the Court imposed a layer, so that schools would not be vicariously
responsible for the odious sexual harassment actions taken by school
employees, when the institutions were unaware of the actions. The Court
identified that notice is not needed to go forward with a Title IX claim where it
is the school’s official policy.66 However, if not, then the potential plaintiff
must place the “appropriate person” on notice.67 The problem engendered by
this qualification is what category of individual at the educational institutions
will fit this definition in order to withstand a motion to dismiss. By not
identifying the permissible categories, the Court essentially ignored the
workings of the normal school system where students routinely come in
contact with teachers and coaches and not the governing or administrative
supervisory personnel. The Court does a disservice if teachers and coaches—
operational employees—are not included to satisfy the notice requirement.68
Regardless, Justice O’Connor began a dialogue with the country in Gebser,
which she continued in Davis, cementing the determination that sexual
harassment in schools that receive federal funds will not be tolerated,
employing her nuanced notice requirements in both cases.
In Jackson, the next installment in her trilogy, Justice O’Connor indicated
that if the purpose of Title IX is to protect individuals being discriminated
against, it must also protect the ones speaking out about the discriminatory
practices. The following syllogism comes to mind: If Title IX protects
students, and teachers and coaches speak out about Title IX to protect the
students, then the teachers and coaches who speak out should also be
protected.
Justice O’Connor understood that schools should not be
repositories of discrimination for our nation’s youth, even though she
fashioned a pre-notice requirement. The image of her holding the scales of
66. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; see also Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957
(9th Cir. 2010) (case settled during 2012) (applying the “official policy” exception in an equal
opportunity athletics-related case); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.
2007) (case settled) (landmark decision, applying the “official policy” exception in a sexual
harassment case involving an intercollegiate athletics department).
67. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; see also Mansourian, 602 F.3d 957; Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170.
68. See Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment, supra note 47, at 477
(identifying three categories of educational employees: Tier I – Governing Employees, Tier II –
Supervisory (Management) Employees, and Tier III – Operative or Operational Employees), 499
(criticizing the standard applied).
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justice comes to mind. In her three Title IX decisions, the rulings or score was
5–4. Without the center fielder on the team, it remains to be seen how the
Roberts Court will treat this civil rights statute intended to protect gender
equity.69
D. The Roberts Court: Introducing the New Chief Umpire
John G. Roberts, Jr. became the seventeenth Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court on October 5, 2005, coinciding with the commencement of the
October 2005–2006 term. The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted four
days of hearings from September 12–15, 2005, to discuss the background and
temperament of Judge Roberts for the elevated position.70 The jurist’s
comportment, during the hearing, is the gold standard for any judicial
nominee. The Senate Judiciary Committee was composed of the following
seventeen men and one woman: Chairman Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.),
Minority Chair Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), Sen.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) (since became Vice-President),71 Sen. Jon Kyl
(R-Ariz.), Sen. Herbert Kohl (D-Wis.), Sen. Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Sen.
69. Cohen, supra note 16 (informing, “But Justice Thomas is a lot less marginal with the recent
changes in the court – particularly the replacement of Sandra Day O’Connor, a moderate
conservative, with Samuel Alito, a more extreme one.”).
70. See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8 (The first day, September 12, 2005
involved the presentation of the witness, Judge Roberts, along with his opening extemporaneous
comments, id. at 1–56 (actual opening comments of Judge Roberts, at 55–56, including the “umpire”
reference), followed by his official written responses, id. at 57–139; the first full day of questioning
by the Senate Judiciary Committee occurred on Tuesday, September 13, 2005, id. at 141–282; the
second day of questioning of the witness followed on Wednesday, September 14, 2005, id. at 283–
411; and the third and final day of questioning of the witness occurred on September 15, 2005, id. at
413–451). The Judiciary Committee ultimately voted 13-5 to approve the nomination. On September
29, 2005, the U.S. Senate confirmed the nomination 78-22; www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
71. During January 2007, Sen. Biden (D-Del.) sought to become the 2008 Democratic candidate
for President. He subsequently withdrew his name from contention. On January 20, 2009, he was
sworn in as Vice President of the United States, along with President Barack Obama, a former U.S.
Senator (D-Ill.). Jeff Zeleny, For the 44th President, a Long Day Steeped in Pomp, History and
Emotion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at P1 (special supplement to mark the occasion of Barack
Obama becoming the nation’s 44th President). Chief Justice Roberts administered the oath of office
to the new President. Adam Liptak, A Few Rough Patches for a Presidential Oath, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2009, at P6. Then-Sen. Obama voted against the elevation of Judge Roberts to the position of
Chief Justice. See obamaspeeches.com/031-Confirmation-of-Judge-John-Roberts-Obama-speech.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2012). See supra note 70. Both President Obama and Chief Justice are graduates
of Harvard Law School and former editors of the Harvard Law Review. Roberts’ Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 8, at 60. Chief Justice Roberts attended the most recent January 2012 State of
the Union address delivered by President Obama. NBC News Coverage of State of the Union
Address (Jan. 24, 2012, 9:20 EST).
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Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) (the only female on the 109th Senate Judiciary
Committee), Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), Sen. Russell D. Feingold (D-Wis.)
(lost his re-election campaign), Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), Sen.
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.), Sen. Sam
Brownback (R-Kan.),72 Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.), and Sen. Tom Coburn
(R-Okla.). The interplay between Sen. Biden and Judge Roberts is especially
poignant due to their current positions, respectively as Vice President of the
United States and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Procedurally, the
questioning started with the Republican Committee Chair and then alternated
between the Democrat and Republican senators on the Committee, who
wanted to interpose questions, or in some cases, commentary. Unlike the
remarks made on the floor of Congress reported in the Congressional Record,
U.S. Senators do not have the privilege to edit their remarks for transcripts of
hearings’ testimony.
As indicated, during Judge Roberts’ Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings
to become Chief Justice, he referred to his role as that of an umpire.73 In his
opening statement to the Committee, he stated:
Judge ROBERTS. My personal appreciation that I owe a
great debt to others reinforces my view that a certain humility
should characterize the judicial role. Judges and Justices are
servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody
ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.74

72. During January 2007, Sen. Brownback (R-Kan.) sought to become the 2008 Republican
candidate to seek the presidency. He announced his withdrawal from the race during October 2007.
Brownback to End Presidential Run, Sources Say, CNNPOLITICS (Oct. 18, 2007), http://articles.cnn.
com/2007-10-18/politics/brownback.dropout_1_presidential-campaign-senator-brownback-opinionresearch-corporation?_s=PM:POLITICS.
73. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 161.
74. Id. at 55 (Sen. Kohl noted,
[b]ut as all of us with any involvement in sports know, no two umpires or no two referees
have the same strike zone or call the same kind of a basketball game, and ballplayers and
basketball players understand that, depending upon who the umpire is and who the referee
is, the game can be called entirely differently.

Id. at 203. Sen. Hatch (R-Utah) commented, “Yesterday you used the analogy of an umpire who
calls balls and strikes, but neither pitches, nor bats.” Id. at 161. Sen. Grassley (R-Iowa) inquired,
“So, Judge Roberts, beyond your umpire analogy, what do you understand to be the role of a judge in
a democratic society?” Id. at 177).
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Of course, cartoonists and the legislators would pounce on this accessible
imagery of the baseball umpire. Additionally, during his opening remarks and
elsewhere, Judge Roberts talked about wanting to be a modest jurist,75
reprising the umpire imagery. He asserted:
Mr. Chairman, I come before the Committee with no agenda.
I have no platform. . . . If I am confirmed, I will confront
every case with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze
the legal arguments that are presented. I will be open to the
considered views of my colleagues on the bench, and I will
decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of
law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to
pitch or bat.76
Interestingly, considering the breadth of topics that may be entertained
during this type of hearing, there was testimony or inquiry as to three of the
Title IX Supreme Court decisions, and the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which
is a rather remarkable scenario.77 Judge Roberts did not entertain any Title IX
cases during his relatively brief tenure as a Circuit Court judge. However, he
was involved with Title IX cases while working for the federal government
and as a private attorney. A certain consistency was exhibited in all three of
these cases, where Mr. Roberts (referred to as Mr. Roberts or Attorney Roberts
for when he was working as an attorney to distinguish his judicial career)
purportedly argued to limit or constrain the reach of Title IX.78 Granted in the
first and second cases, Grove City College79 and Franklin,80 Mr. Roberts was
working in the executive branch of the U.S. Government (respectively as
Special Assistant to the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug.
1981–Nov. 1982) during President Reagan’s first term; Associate Counsel to
President Ronald Reagan, White House Counsel’s Office (Nov. 1982–May
1986); and a member of the legal staff at the U.S. Department of Justice –
Principal Deputy Solicitor General (Oct. 1989–Jan. 1993) during President
George H.W. Bush’s administration), and thus was charged with presenting
the role of his employer.81 And according to Judge Roberts, he “was not
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
See infra Parts III, IV and V. See also Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8.
Id.
See generally Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555.
See generally Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.
See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 58, 69, 72.
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formulating policy.”82 However, in the third case, NCAA v. Smith,83 the
NCAA had its own in-house counsel, and Mr. Roberts, who was then a
seasoned lawyer and partner at a prestigious law firm, was hired as a private
attorney to represent the most influential and powerful athletic association in
the country.
During the 1990s, a few litigants commenced cases arguing violation of
both Title IX and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),84 a
congressional statute aimed at protecting women from violence. The
Rehnquist Court ultimately ruled the VAWA legislation was unconstitutional
as exceeding the Article I powers conferred upon Congress in the U.S.
Constitution.85 In a question from Sen. Joseph Biden, a strong supporter of
the VAWA statute, the following interaction occurred:
Senator BIDEN. Okay. Judge, is gender discrimination, as
you have written in a memo, a “perceived” problem or is it a
real problem?
Judge ROBERTS. The memo you talked about, Senator, I’ve
had a chance to look at it. It concerned a 50-State inventory
of particular proposals to address it. “Perceived” was not
82. Id. at 175. See infra note 114 (explaining the role of the U.S. Solicitor General. However,
in his written response, he explained his governmental work: “Immediately prior to joining [a private
law firm] for the first time in 1986, I served in counseling and advisory roles in the federal
government. My duties as Associate Counsel to the President involved reviewing bills submitted to
the President for signature or veto, drafting and reviewing executive orders and proclamations, and
generally reviewing the full range of Presidential activities for potential legal problems.” Roberts’
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 71. As to his work as the Special Assistant to the U.S.
Attorney General, Judge Roberts informed that “My duties. . . were also of an advisory nature,
focusing on particular matters of concern to the Attorney General.” Id. at 72.
83. See generally Smith, 525 U.S. 459.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
85. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) (The
plaintiff-female student claimed she was raped by two university male football players. She alleged a
violation of Title IX and the VAWA, based on allegations of preferential treatment provided to one of
the alleged perpetrators, and lack of proper protocol in following the university procedure for inquiry
into this kind of case), en banc decision vacating an earlier court decision; Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (7–4 ruling), aff’d, sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (ruling the federal statute was unconstitutional in violation of
the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8). Previously, in Ericson v. Syracuse University, 45 F.
Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), a New York district court had upheld the constitutionality of the
VAWA, in another dual Title IX-VAWA case predicated on allegations of sexual harassment by the
male women’s tennis coach toward two of his female tennis players. The parties ultimately settled
the case. See Diane Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims Involving Educational Athletic
Department Employees and Student-Athletes in the Twenty-First Century, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
223, 243-44 (2009) [hereinafter Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims] (discussing the
case); Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 202–03 (same) .
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being used in that case to suggest that there was any doubt
that there is gender discrimination and that it should be
addressed. . . .
Of course, gender discrimination is a serious problem. It’s a
particular concern of mine and always has been. I grew up
with three sisters, all of whom work outside the home. I
married a lawyer who works outside the home. I have a
young daughter who I hope will have all of the opportunities
available to her without regard to any gender discrimination.
There is no suggestion in anything that I’ve written of any
resistance to the basic idea of full citizenship without regard
to gender.86
Title IX litigants have also asserted violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.87 The Supreme Court has imposed
three tests to ascertain if a violation of this provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment has occurred: (1) a strict scrutiny test is imposed for fundamental
rights (education is not deemed a fundamental right)88 and for classifications
based on suspect classes (based on race, alienage or national origin);89 notably,
it does not include sex within that arena; (2) an intermediate test has been
imposed for classifications based on an individual’s sex (gender) or birth
legitimacy; and (3) a reasonable relationship test90 is used for all other
classifications, such as those based on age or disability. Later on in the
hearing, Judge Roberts discussed the three tiers relative to the Fourteenth
86. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 190. There were a number of references to
the Morrison case during the hearings with the Senators, understandably quite concerned about the
judicial infringement on their ability to legislate. Id. at 225, 356.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which directs, in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

88. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Diane Heckman,
Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2005) [hereinafter Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process].
89. See Diane Heckman, The First Amendment and Academia: Twenty Years of Examining
Matters of Public Concern, 188 EDUC. L. REP. 585 (2004).
90. “Under ‘traditional’ equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained
unless it is ‘patently arbitrary’ and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest.” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause, where he proffered,
Gender issues are in the middle tier because the Court thinks
that there are situations where distinctions can be justified,
and there are other situations—but it’s more than just the
rational relation, but not as suspect as the most heightened
level because there may be other justifications. Cases
throughout the Court’s history where they have upheld
distinctions under that analysis, like the all-male draft, for
example, that was upheld . . .
....
. . . Justice Ginsburg, I think, in her opinion in the VMI case
said that the intermediate scrutiny had to be applied with—I
forgot the exact phrase—”exacting rigor” or something along
those lines, to indicate that it is well beyond the rational
relation test, but it’s not as inherently suspect as racial
classifications.91
Historically, the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment would have deemed sex a
suspect class and thus entitled to the greatest legal protection.92 However, this
constitutional amendment was not ratified by the necessary two-thirds of states
within the allotted time period. During 1973, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the
Supreme Court would impose the highest test to classifications based on sex;
however, its utility is circumscribed, as this was only a plurality decision.93
The Court first referenced the intermediate test in Craig v. Boren.94 In
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court fleshed out a
pervasiveness justification requirement for state action to be deemed
constitutional when classifications are based upon an individual’s sex.95
91. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 281–82 (referring to United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
92. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1971) (approved by the House of Representatives on Oct. 12,
1971). It would have required that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” Id. See H.R. Equal Rights for Men and
Women (July 14, 1971), to accompany H.R.J. Res. 208, available at www.archives.gov/
legislative/features/griffiths/committee-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
93. See generally Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677.
94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (directing that such classifications “by gender
must serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”). See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (allowing female wage earners to
lop off their three lowest earning years when calculating Social Security benefits to remedy past
discrimination, whereas male workers were not treated the same).
95. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (mandating an “exceedingly
persuasive” standard). The Court also imparted, “In limited circumstances, a gender-based
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Later, in United States v. Virginia,96 the Court reiterated the “pervasiveness
justification” test in a case dealing with whether females could be restricted
from admission to the Virginia Military College, one of the two remaining allmale public colleges in the country.97 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg instructed:
Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action
must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification”
for that action . . . . Focusing on the differential treatment or
denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing
court must determine whether the proffered justification is
“exceedingly persuasive.” The burden of justification is
demanding and it rests entirely on the State . . . . The
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented
post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.98
As one court stated, “[i]n sex discrimination cases brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must demonstrate that the discrimination was
intentional.”99 The Equal Protection Clause has been the legal theory for
redress in many actions in the area of gender equity involving extracurricular
athletic activities.100 As a Second Circuit Court judge wrote, “[i]t is
classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the
sex that is disproportionately burdened.” Id. at 728.
96. See generally 518 U.S. 515 (emphasizing the “exceedingly persuasive” standard) (Justice
Ginsburg authored the majority opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a concurring opinion joining
in on the judgment rendered, while Justice Scalia presented his dissent, id. at 558 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)) (Justice Clarence Thomas recused himself as his son was attending Virginia Military
Institute at the time of the appeal).
97. The Citadel, located in South Carolina, was the country’s other public military school. It
was also embroiled in litigation challenging its all-male admission policy. See United States v. Jones,
136 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1998). See also Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993).
98. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–33. Justice Ginsburg also cited material in a letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval. Id. at 532. See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the
Gym, supra note 4, at 556–58; Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 4, at 394.
99. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552, 553 (E.D. Va. 1988) (discussed within). Upon its remand
from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court in Cannon, 648 F.2d at 1107, stated, “A violation
of the Equal Protection clause had previously been held to require a finding of intentional
discrimination; disparate impact alone will not support a cause of action under the Constitution.”
100. See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 4, at 4 n.14. See, e.g., Miami Univ.
Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff’d, 802 F.3d 608 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999) (men’s wrestling team); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198
F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999) (men’s swimming and wrestling teams), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000);
Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998) (sexual harassment action), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (granting of a
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irrefutable that Congress could not, by enacting a statute like Title IX,
somehow erode or limit a constitutional right such as the right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States.”101
Surprisingly, Judge Roberts could not identify the actual test.102
A review of the salient material from the Roberts’ confirmation hearings is
presented within; for an introspection as to how this jurist viewed critical
aspects of Title IX. Part III discusses the provision of compensatory money
preliminary injunction in favor of female student-athletes), aff’d, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), 101
F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (sanctioning the grant of a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997) (retaining two women’s intercollegiate sports: gymnastics and
volleyball); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994) (interscholastic
fastpitch softball) (finding no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause);
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause) (male student-athletes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128
(1995); Sullivan v. Cleveland Heights, 869 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no equal protection
violation concerning a 10-year-old female who was not allowed to use the same locker room as her
male teammates on the community hockey team); Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 858 F.2d 579
(9th Cir. 1988) (concerning scheduling of certain girls’ interscholastic teams); Cook v. Colgate Univ.,
802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (elevating women’s ice hockey club team to an intercollegiate
sport), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.
1981), on remand, 545 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (denying female’s request seeking
participation on boys’ basketball team); Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 424 F. Supp.
732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev’d, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (examining differing rules used for girls’
versus boys’ high school basketball and finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation); Barnett v. Tex.
Wrestling Ass’n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (female student seeking participation on the all
boys’ interscholastic wrestling team); Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1500 (D. Kan. 1996)
(wrestling) (finding a violation of the female student-athlete’s rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause) (interscholastic wrestling); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp.
989 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (awarding of athletic scholarships at this private university); Lantz v. Ambach,
620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (female seeking to participate on all-boys’ interscholastic football
team); Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (female student
seeking to participate on the all boys’ eighth grade football team); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.
Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (female student-athlete seeking participation on the all boys’ junior varsity
soccer team); Jones v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
(alleging a detrimental impact by having female use girls’ basketball rules, which included using
merely half the court, as opposed to the boys’ basketball rules, using the full court); Leffel v. Wis.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (concerning lack of certain
teams for the girls, including any baseball or tennis teams) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Gilpin v. Kan. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973) (there
was only a cross-country track team for boys and none for the girls); Haas v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) (interscholastic golf team) (finding athletic association rule which
prevented “mixed competition” in non-contact sports violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
501). See also Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process, supra note 88, at 16 n.68
(listing a number of Title IX related cases where the courts held that no property interest was
triggered needed to satisfy a prima facie Fourteenth Amendment case, whereby a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a life, liberty or property interest was triggered).
101. Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 763 (Oakes, C.J., concurring). See Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra
note 25, at 859 (providing background information on the jurisdictional and procedural matters
involved in Title IX litigation).
102. See Bruneau, 163 F.3d 749. See also supra text accompanying note 99.
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damages, at issue in the Franklin case, which is positioned as a procedural
aspect (because a potential plaintiff would want to know what remediation is
available when drafting a complaint and pursuing litigation). This is followed
by an examination of the jurisdictional aspect of necessitating the receipt of
federal funds by the defendant, at issue in the Grove City College and NCAA v.
Smith cases, which is presented in Parts IV and V. Two points that need
emphasizing: first, Mr. Roberts was operating in the rarefied highest echelons
of Republican politics; and second, this individual has an extraordinary
command of the English language and facility in answering questions so that a
review of his oral and written remarks are instructive. Clearly, this is a
brilliant and successful man, a multi-millionaire, with an impeccable
curriculum vitae, including being a graduate of Harvard University Law
School, editor of the Harvard Law Review, a former law clerk to Chief Justice
Rehnquist (1980–1981), as well as one of the “go to guys” to argue a case
before the Supreme Court, before being placed on possibly the most influential
Circuit Court in the country today, the District of Columbia Circuit Court.103
III. TITLE IX REMEDIES: “SHOW ME THE MONEY”104 – STRIKE ONE
Overall, the possible remedies available to a Title IX plaintiff would be
the following: (1) the withdrawal of federal funds to the educational
institution, which is explicitly permitted by the statute;105 (2) declarative
relief, to declare the rights of the parties;106 (3) injunctive relief to order the
educational institution to cease engaging in the discriminatory action or to
undertake certain actions to ameliorate the situation;107 and (4) the award of
monetary damages. The issue of what damages are permitted has been an area
of contention. This is once again fostered due to the lack of statutory language
concerning the issuance of damages.108
A. Compensatory Damages
Litigants routinely sought injunctive relief to end the Title IX
103. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 57–71, 133.
104. Dialogue from the movie, JERRY MAGUIRE (Gracie Films & TriStar Pictures 1996).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
106. See, e.g., Leffel, 444 F. Supp. at 1119.
107. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907 (affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction in favor
of the female student-athletes) (The Court stated, “On the record compiled to date, the preliminary
injunction requiring Brown [University] to reinstate its women’s volleyball and gymnastics teams for
the time being came well within the encincture of judicial discretion. We will not meddle.”); Roberts
v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 833 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e believe monetary relief alone
is inadequate. The district court correctly ordered an equitable remedy.”).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
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discriminatory activity, or less frequently, declaratory action relief.
Remarkably, it would take until 1992, in Franklin,109 when the Supreme
Court—in its third Title IX decision—ruled that a plaintiff could be awarded
pecuniary damages, where intentional discrimination was proven.110 It was
this opinion that triggered a groundswell of litigation, so that in addition to
seeking court orders to cease the gender-based discrimination, now the
students and educational employees sought to be compensated for the
purported violations. Large judgments have not been the norm, generally due
to the history of Title IX, the burden on litigants to successfully assert a prima
facie case,111 and the delayed pronouncement that compensatory damages
were permitted.112 There was some dicta, by the Supreme Court in Gebser, a
post-Franklin case, as to whether compensatory damages should issue in a
case involving allegations of sexual harassment.113 The Court has provided no
further comments on the issue of monetary damages—thus, the status quo
exists.
B. Roberts’ 2005 Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing
The Supreme Court invited the Federal Government to weigh in on the
issue of whether it should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Franklin case to address the issue whether the Title IX statute allowed for
compensatory damages. The U.S. Solicitor General’s brief asserted the
affirmative position that the Court should review the case, but that damages
should not be allowed.114 This first brief filed by U.S. Solicitor General
109. Franklin, 503 U.S. 60. See Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra note 25, at 867.
110. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
111. See infra text accompanying note 129.
112. See Croteau, 686 F. Supp. 552 (where the female high school student unsuccessfully
sought $100,000 in compensatory damages for not being put on the boys’ varsity interscholastic
baseball team). Julie Croteau went on to appear in the movie, A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN (Columbia
Pictures Corporation 1992), depicting a women’s professional softball team during World War II.
However, settlements in certain Title IX sexual harassment cases have resulted in large monetary
figures. See Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 85, at 252, 267, 269.
113. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. See also Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra note 25, at 867.
114. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist. (1992)
(No. 90-918), 1991 WL 11009216, at *20 (filed on May 20, 1991, by the Hon. Kenneth W. Starr,
U.S. Solicitor General). Like Justice Roberts, Starr was also a law clerk to Chief Justice William J.
Rehnquist (1975–1977), and a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit Court (1983–1989). Starr
was Solicitor General (1989–1993) during President George H.R. Bush’s administration. The
nominee explained the role indicating that he “worked in the Department of Justice in the Office of
the Solicitor General, it was my job to argue cases for the United States before the Supreme Court. I
always found it very moving to stand before the Justices and say, ‘I speak for my country.’” Roberts’
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 55. He further elaborated, “With minor exceptions, the Office
of the Solicitor General is the exclusive representative of the federal government before the Supreme
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Kenneth W. Starr, which featured the name of John G. Roberts, Jr.
prominently in the third position as Deputy Solicitor General, interjected, “[i]n
our view, the [Eleventh Circuit] court of appeals was correct in its conclusion
that Title IX does not impliedly authorize a private plaintiff to recover
compensatory legal damages, even if the plaintiff alleges an intentional
violation of the statute.”115 The Court agreed to hear this appeal during the
October 1991 term. The Court permitted the U.S. Solicitor General to
participate in oral arguments as to the merits of the case.116
The Senate Committee questioned Judge Roberts on his contemporaneous
view of Franklin. As a deputy attorney working with Kenneth Starr, then U.S.
Solicitor General, Mr. Roberts’ name appeared on a brief on the merits
purportedly arguing that the female student subject to physical sexual
harassment was not entitled to monetary damages, according to Sen. Patrick
Leahy (D-Vt.) (Minority Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee) [internal
footnotes are used to annotate the material].
Senator LEAHY. Justice White, in an opinion joined by
Justice O’Connor and others wrote that you fundamentally
misunderstood the law and history of the Court’s role in
providing appropriate remedy for such abuse, and that you
had invited them to abdicate their historical judicial authority
to award appropriate relief [pursuant to Title IX].
So do you now personally agree with and accept as binding
law the reasoning of Justice White’s opinion in Franklin?117
Judge ROBERTS. Well, it certainly is a precedent of the
Court that I would apply under [the] principle[] of stare
decisis. The Government’s position in that case, of course, in
no way condoned the activities involved. The issue was an
open one. The courts of appeals had ruled the same way that
the Government had argued before the Supreme Court, and it
arose because we were dealing with an implied right of action,
in other words, [a] right of action under the statute that courts
Court.” Id. at 72. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Rehnquist’s Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, § 7, at 14
(reviewing the following autobiography, KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS (2002),
wherein “Starr concedes that ‘justices appointed for life’ constitute ‘the least accountable branch of
government.’”). The Solicitor General is the “President’s chief advocate before the Supreme Court.”
TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 16.
115. Brief of the United States, supra note 114, at *6. See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra
note 4, at 23 n.100.
116. Franklin, 502 U.S. 803. See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 4, at 23 n.101.
117. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72–73.
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had implied. The reason that there was difficulty in
determining exactly what remedies were available is because
Congress had not addressed that question. The remedies that
were available, as we explained, included issues such as
restitution, backpay, injunctive relief, and the open issue,
again, was whether damages were available. The Supreme
Court issued its ruling and cleared that up.118
This colloquy featured no mention of the Third Circuit’s 1990 opinion in
Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District,119 reflecting the opposite
viewpoint that could have alternatively been adopted by the federal
government when invited to offer its position in the Franklin case.
Parenthetically, the Title IX statute contains absolutely no explicit mention
of providing “backpay”—essentially this was a transfer of Title VII remedies
onto Title IX. This emphasis by the nominee on indicating that the statute
allowed for backpay and the only unsettled aspect was the money damages is a
bit of a mystery. A review of the Supreme Court decision in Franklin120
illustrates that the Court devoted specific attention to the issue of backpay and
responded in unequivocal language as to what it thought of the Government’s
position. While remedies could be limited where legislation was hinged upon
the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, this did not apply when
intentional discrimination appeared. The Court stated, “[f]inally, the United
States asserts that the remedies permissible under Title IX should nevertheless
be limited to backpay and prospective relief. In addition to diverging from our
traditional approach to deciding what remedies are available for violation of a
118. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 156–57 (emphasis added). It was curious
that Judge Roberts identified the remedy of “backpay,” which while common in Title VII
employment actions, was not in Title IX cases. The author cannot recall one pre-Franklin case where
a court awarded a plaintiff backpay pursuant to Title IX. In addition, the controversy over whether
Title IX could be used at all by an educational employee to successfully seek redress for sex
discrimination by an educational institution was and remains a contested issue. See supra Section
III(A). See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 4, at 597–600 (citing Tyler v.
Howard Univ., No. 91-CA11239 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1995) (post-Franklin ruling awarding the
female basketball coach damages for retaliation and lost pay for breach of both Title IX and a District
of Columbia statute)).
119. 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (herein a female sought compensatory damages for her
dismissal from the local chapter of a National Honor Society, due to her pregnancy. The National
Women’s Law Center represented the former high school student. The Third Circuit Court accessed
the Cannon opinion, stating, “the Supreme Court indicated that Congress intended to create remedies
in Title IX comparable to those available under Title VI.” Id. at 787. The court continued, “Tracking
this analysis to a Title IX claim, we now conclude, not without some difficulty, that compensatory
relief is available for certain Title IX violations and that this is one of them.” Id. at 788). See supra
note 112 (concerning the 1988 Croteau litigation).
120. Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.
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federal right, this position conflicts with sound logic.”121 The Court
continued, “[b]ackpay does nothing for petitioner [a student] . . . and [since]
she herself no longer attends a school in the Gwinnett system, prospective
relief accords her no remedy at all. The Government’s answer that
administrative action helps other similarly situated students in effect
acknowledges that its approach would leave petitioner remediless.”122 That
the jurist, in the interim decade, never updated his understanding of the
remediation Title IX affords, despite the Franklin ruling on a case he worked
on, is distressing.
And, of significance, while Judge Roberts answered the direct question
posed by the Senator in his first sentence, the remainder of the jurist’s
response was essentially a summary of the Government’s argument presented
to the Court. It was certainly not an effusive endorsement of the Franklin
ruling, but simply an abstract declaration of a fundamental element of
American jurisprudence. Significantly, Judge Roberts did, however, indicate
his intent to apply the Court’s holding.
The colloquy about this case continued with Sen. Leahy stressing the
sexual abuse the tenth-grade female student had received by a male teacher
and “sports coach” in the Franklin case. After receiving Judge Roberts’
response, Sen. Leahy then asked:
Senator LEAHY. Now, do you feel that they [the Supreme
Court] were acting, even though it went differently than what
you had argued [on behalf of the Government], do you feel
the Court’s opinion is based on sound reasoning?
Judge ROBERTS. Well, I don’t want to say—
Senator LEAHY. Do you think it is a solid precedent?
Judge ROBERTS. It is a solid—it’s a precedent of the Court.
It was, as you say, a unanimous precedent. It concerned an
issue of statutory interpretation because it was unclear
121. Id. at 75 (The Court continued, “First, both remedies are equitable in nature, and it is
axiomatic that a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable
relief.” Id. 75–76). Brief of the United States, supra note 113, at *19.
The same objectives should inform the scope of any private remedies under Title IX.
Equitable relief—including, when appropriate, such “make whole” relief as backpay—
serves to enforce compliance with the statute. Awards of legal damages to selected
beneficiaries of federal financing programs, by contrast, would threaten “a potentially
massive financial liability,” . . . while securing compliance only indirectly through
deterrence.

Id.
122. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
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whether Congress had intended a particular remedy to be
available or not. That was the question before the Court. The
court of appeals had ruled one way. The Supreme Court ruled
the other way.
The administration’s position was based on the principle that
the decision about the remedy of backpay was a decision that
should be made by Congress and not the Court. The Court
saw the case the other, and that issue is now settled, and those
damages actions are brought in courts around the country.123
Judge Roberts started to mirror the senator’s characterization in the first
sentence of this reply and then, according to the transcript, immediately put
the reins on the statement, simply as he did initially with this line of inquiry
introduced by this senator, stating the obvious and nothing more.
Sen. Leahy then called Judge Roberts on the backpay remedy, inquiring
what type of backpay would a student receive, which was a fair point—and
again, Title IX, even before Franklin, was not known by the courts for ever
awarding backpay. It was as if the Title VII statute was being substituted for
this Title IX matter, which is surprising because the nominee was so
knowledgeable about the law, providing detailed legal discourse to the
Committee, and by extension the Nation, on many legal topics. While Judge
Roberts found the underlying behavior in the Franklin case “abhorrent
then . . . [and] now,”124 one can see the verbal agility or dexterity of this
individual,125 as he immediately dropped the backpay quest, and responded:
Judge ROBERTS. Restitution and injunction to prohibit the
harmful activity. Again, the issue arose because Congress had
not spelled out whether there was a right of action in the first
place or what the components of that right of action should be.
The issue—
Senator LEAHY. We will go back to this in my next round, I
123. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 157 (emphasis added). See Brief of the
United States, supra note 114, at *15 (“We believe that the statute is not framed in terms suggesting
that awards of damages are essential for effective enforcement.”).
124. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 157.
125. In the written questionnaire, as to supplying the text of any speeches that the nominee may
have given, Judge Roberts replied that he used none—that there were no prepared texts, which was
evident by the judicial candidate not referring to a written text during his opening remarks to the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. at 67 (“On no occasion did I speak from a prepared text. Notes or
recordings are available only as indicated.” There were notes for only two of the many public
speeches).
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can assure you. My time is up.126
Thus, in all that banter, the best that Judge Roberts could say about the
Supreme Court opinion in Franklin was that it was a precedent. For a man so
extraordinarily facile and in command of his words, as exemplified by his
enormous scholarly and legal achievements and being hired to argue numerous
cases before the Supreme Court, his inability to verbalize the sentence that it
was a “strong precedent” as opposed to merely a precedent should not be
comforting for advocates of Title IX.127 The words of Justice Scalia are
triggered, wherein he begrudgingly supported the majority position in
Franklin, with his reasoning that essentially too much water had passed under
the bridge.128
On September 15, 2005, Sen. Leahy did return to the Franklin case.
Senator LEAHY [summarily going through the Court’s
rationale] Now, the reason I raise this case [Franklin] is not
that it is one of those rare ones where you were on the losing
side, but I raise it because I felt it was a case about what our
courts should do, including doing justice and remedying rights
and protecting Americans.
So my question to you is this: Do you now recognize that the
Supreme Court’s view in the case as set forth in Justice
White’s opinion was the right one and the positions of the
United States in your brief were the wrong ones?
Judge ROBERTS. Well, as a judge looking at it, obviously
when you lose a case, as you point out, [9-0] it’s a pretty clear
signal that the legal position you were advocating was the
wrong one. The position the administration took in that case
was the same position that the court of appeals had taken. . . .
126. Id. at 157.
127. Id. (emphasis added). Later on in the hearing, Sen. Sessions (R-Alabama) would afford
Judge Roberts an opportunity to bolster that what he did at the time was advocating the position of the
“highest Federal court in the land at that time.” Id. at 230.
128. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76–78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting it was “too late in the
day.” Id. at 78). Judge Roberts revealed, “And at argument sometimes, Justice Scalia would not be
as receptive to an argument based on legislative history as some of the others, but, again, the name of
the game is counting to five when you’re arguing up there.” Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra
note 8, at 320. This recounts Justice Brennan’s “Rule of Five,” referring to the number of Supreme
Court justices needed to form a majority. See TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 84–85 (Like the other
justices, Breyer knew the famous question that William Brennan used to ask his law clerks. “What’s
the most important law at the Supreme Court?” . . . the justice would raise his tiny hand and say,
“Five! The law of five! With five votes, you can do anything around here!”).
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...
Senator LEAHY. And I understand that. I thought I sort of
laid that out earlier. But my question is: Do you now accept
that Justice White’s position was right and that the
Government’s position was wrong?
Judge ROBERTS. Well, I certainly accept the decision of the
Court, the 9–0 decision, as you say, as a binding precedent of
the Court and, again, have no cause or agenda to revisit it or
any quarrel with it.129
This is another example of the jurist’s ability to parse his words and stand
his ground, accepting the decision as precedent, but not answering whether it
was the right position. For Title IX advocates, this would constitute strike one
against Title IX.
IV. THE RECEIPT OF FEDERAL FUNDS: STRIKE TWO
A. Recipient of Federal Funds by the Educational Institutions
In order to establish a general Title IX prima facie case, the following
elements are required: (1) the defendant took discriminatory action against the
plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s sex; (2) the defendant is an educational
institution; (3) that is a recipient of federal funds; and (4) the plaintiff placed
the defendant on notice, prior to the lawsuit, about the discriminatory action,
unless it was the official policy of the educational institution.130 The third
aspect would be contentious. It is rare for an educational institution not to
receive federal funds.131 Whether the particular program or activity received
federal funds (program-specific approach), or it was sufficient for some part of
the educational institution to receive federal funds and thus trigger oversight
over the entire institution and all its separate programs and activities
(institution-wide approach) was an issue that would ultimately land before the
Supreme Court.
In Grove City College, the Supreme Court, in eschewing a broad
interpretation, found that the particular program or activity that is alleged to be
129. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 413–14.
130. See Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, supra note 33, at 2–3;
Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra note 25, at 849, 850.
131. But see Buckley v. Archdiocese of Rockville Ctr., 992 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding that a private coed Roman Catholic high school and the overseeing archdiocese were not
under Title IX solely because the diocese received the services of a single employee of the public
school district, a school psychologist).
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at the core of the Title IX sex discrimination, must receive the actual federal
funds for the lawsuit to proceed.132 As one court recounted about the lawsuit
commenced against the Secretary of Education,
[r]egulations promulgated under that section [§ 901(a)]
forbade aid to educational programs which did not execute an
“Assurance of Compliance” required by 34 C.F.R. § 106.4
(1983). Grove City College [a private college] did not
discriminate, did not receive any direct federal aid, but [due
to] religious and other First Amendment protected grounds
declined to enter into compacts with the government and
refused to execute the Assurance of Compliance.133
In the case of colleges and universities, it was common for students to
receive federal funding to subsidize their tuitions and for student-athletes to
receive athletic scholarships. The Court found that such federal monies only
went to the admissions office—the particular office that received the student
aid—and not to the college as a whole, for educational services for which the
monies were remitted.
This “effectively nullified” Title IX’s application, resulting in
congressional action to revise the statute, to specifically use a broad-based
approach.134 Albeit, it took Congress four years to pass the Restoration
Act,135 which applied not only to Title IX,136 but a number of other federal
132. 465 U.S. 555. The Court informed that, although the college received no direct federal
funding, however “Grove City’s students receive BEOG’s [Basic Educational Opportunity Grants] to
pay for the education they receive at the College. Their eligibility for assistance is conditioned upon
continued enrollment at Grove City and on satisfactory progress in their studies. 20 U.S.C. §
1091(a)(1), (3) (1982 ed.).” Id. at 566 n.13. See, e.g., Bennett v. W. Tex. State Univ., 799 F.2d 155,
158 (5th Cir. 1986) (in this post-Grove City class action case, the Fifth Circuit Court determined
“[t]his type of ‘trickle down’ benefit is just the type that Grove City explicitly ruled did not trigger
Title IX coverage.” It found there was “merely a ministerial relationship between the two programs
[athletic department and financial aid department], insufficient to bring athletic scholarships under
Title IX coverage.” Id. at 159. The university’s athletic department had received no earmarked
federal funds.
133. DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
134. See Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 4, at 403. See also EQUAL PLAY, supra note 41, at
100.
In addition to slashing enforcement budgets, President Reagan’s administration attempted
to squelch Title IX’s broader application with a new limiting interpretation of the law’s
reach. Whereas, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had all interpreted Title IX
to prohibit discrimination throughout any institution if it received federal funds, Reagan
officials wrote the administrative rules so that only the specific program that received the
federal funds was covered by antidiscrimination laws.

135.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1687. For cases examining the Restoration Act’s constitutionality and
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statutes,137 to legislatively adopt the institution-wide approach. There has
been no substantive challenge to the revision, which represents the last change
to the Title IX statute. However, because the Restoration Act contained no
language as to whether it would be retroactively applied, it triggered some
minimal litigation for those cases on the docket when the change was
enacted.138
B. Roberts’ 2005 Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing
An area of major concern at both the Roberts and Alito hearings, as
manifested by the commentary and questions posed by the senators on the
Judiciary Committee concerned the ability of Congress to pass legislation—
presumably, representing the will of the nation (and the legislative role of the
Senate and House of Representatives)—without it being trampled on by the
Supreme Court based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
impediments. No less than three senators on the Committee directed questions
to Judge Roberts about the Grove City College decision and the subsequent
Restoration Act. It must be remembered that the Roberts’ confirmation
hearing reflected partisan politics, with the Democratic members interrogating
the nominee while the Republicans were looking to bolster this candidate
designated by a Republican President.
1. Interrogation by Sen. Ted Kennedy
During the Roberts’ confirmation hearings, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (DMass.), whose political legacy focused on the area of civil rights, pointedly
inquired of then-Judge Roberts about his role regarding the then-Reagan
Administration’s perception of both the Grove City College decision and
subsequent Restoration Act. A problem arises as to the source for purported
written statements by the nominee, as it was not specifically identified and
does not appear to be appended within the transcript of the Hearings. Sen.
Kennedy provided a succinct review of the Grove City College decision
[internal footnotes have been added for informational purposes]:
Senator KENNEDY. Let me, if I could, go to the Civil Rights

retroactive application, see Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414
(E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 869 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1989); Crouteau, 686 F. Supp. 552.
136. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
137. See, e.g., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2011).
138. See, e.g., Leake, , 869 F.2d 130(concluding the Restoration Act would provide retroactive
application to Rehabilitation Act cases).
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Restoration Act.139 In 1981, you supported an effort by the
Department of Education to reverse 17 years of civil rights
protections at colleges and universities that receive Federal
funds.140 Under the new regulations, the definition of Federal
assistance to colleges and universities would be narrowed to
exclude certain types of students loans and grants so that
fewer institutions would be covered by the civil rights laws.
As a result, more colleges and universities would legally be
able to discriminate against people of color, women, and the
disabled.141
Your efforts to narrow the protection of the civil rights laws
did not stop there, however. In 1984, in Grove City v. Bell,
the Supreme Court decided, contrary to the Department of
Education regulations that you supported, that student loans
and grants did, indeed, constitute Federal assistance to
colleges for purposes of triggering civil rights protections.
But in a surprising twist, the Court concluded that the nondiscrimination laws were intended to apply only to the
specific program receiving the funds and not to the institution
as a whole. . . .
A strong bipartisan majority in both the House and the Senate
decided to pass another law, the Civil Rights Restoration Act,
to make it clear that they intended to prohibit discrimination
in all programs and activities of a university that received
Federal assistance. You vehemently opposed the Civil Rights
Restoration Act. Even after the Grove City Court found
otherwise, you still believed that there was—and this is your
quote—”a good deal of intuitive appeal to the argument that
Federal loans and grants to students should not be viewed as

139. 20 U.S.C. § 1687, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
140. The specific statement or memorandum was not identified or supplied in the Hearing
transcript. Judge Roberts identified a proposal of U.S. Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell.
Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 174–75. Secretary Bell held the position during the
first term of the Reagan Administration, from 1981–1984, and was the named defendant in two of the
major Title IX cases, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), and Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In referring to seventeen years, Sen. Kennedy was probably
referring to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as with the addition of seventeen
years, it would come to 1981 (the year of the alleged memorandum, rather than when Title IX was
enacted, which was in 1972).
141. Presumably, referring to other federal statutes.
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Federal financial assistance to the university.”142 You realize,
of course, that these loans and grants to the students were paid
to the university as tuition.
Then even though you
acknowledged that the program-specific aspect of the
Supreme Court decision was going to be overturned by the
congressional legislation, you continued to believe that it
would be “too onerous” for colleges to comply with
nondiscrimination laws across the entire university unless it
was “on the basis of something more solid than Federal aid to
students.”
. . . Do you still believe today that it is too onerous for the
Government to require universities that accept tuition
payments from students, who rely on Federal grants and loans
not to discriminate in any of their programs or activities?
Judge ROBERTS. No, Senator, and I did not back then. You
have not accurately represented my position.
. . . [Interplay among Sen. Kennedy, Chairman Specter and
Judge Roberts as to whether Senator Kennedy had given the
nominee a sufficient opportunity to complete his response.]
Judge ROBERTS. Senator, you did not accurately represent
my position. The Grove City College case presented two
separate questions, and it was a matter being litigated, of
course, in the courts. The universities were arguing that they
were not covered at all by the civil rights laws in question
simply because their students had Federal financial assistance
and attended their universities. That was their first argument.
The second argument was, even if they were covered, all that
was covered was the admissions office and not other programs
that themselves did not receive separate financial assistance.
Our position, the position of the administration—and, again,
that was the position I was advancing.143 I was not
formulating policy. I was articulating and defending the
administration position. And the administration’s position
was, yes, you are covered if the students receive Federal
142. Again, the specific memorandum was not identified or attached as an exhibit in the official
transcript released. See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8. This was presumably adopting
a direct approach, rather than an indirect one, as the money went to students who then gave it to
universities. This argument would prove successful in insulating the NCAA in NCAA v. Smith. 525
U.S. 459 (1999).
143. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 175 (emphasis added).
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financial assistance, and that the coverage extended to the
admissions office. That was the position that the Supreme
Court agreed with. We were interpreting legislation. The
question is: What is the correct interpretation of the
legislation? The position that the administration advanced
was the one I have just described. The universities were
covered due to Federal financial assistance to their students.
It extended to the admissions office.
The Supreme Court in the Grove City case agreed with that
position. So the position the administration had articulated,
the Supreme Court concluded, was a correct interpretation of
what this body, the Congress, had enacted.
Congress then changed the position about coverage, and that
position was, I believe, signed into law by the President and
that became the new law.144 The memo you read about
[HEW] Secretary Bell’s proposal,145 if I remember it, was,
well, he said, if we’re going to cover all of the universities,
then we shouldn’t hinge coverage simply on Federal financial
assistance. And the position I took in the memorandum was
that, no, we should not revisit that question. We should not
revisit the question that Federal financial assistance triggers
coverage.
Senator KENNEDY. I have the memo here.146 I have 22
seconds left. And your quote is this, “If the entire institution
is to be covered, however, it should be on the basis of
something more solid than Federal aid to the students.” I
think most of the Members of the Congress feel that if the aid
to the universities, tuition, loans and grants are going to be
sufficient to trigger all of the civil rights laws—your
memorandum here, “If the entire institution is to be covered,
however, it should be on the basis of something more solid
than Federal aid to the students.” That is your memorandum.
Judge ROBERTS. Well, Senator, again, the administration
policy was as I articulated it, and it was my job to articulate

144. Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1687, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28.
145. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 175–76 (not supplied). See supra note
140 (concerning Sec. Bell).
146. Id.
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the administration policy.147
After all that exchange, one learned nothing about how the nominee
viewed the issue contemporaneously, as opposed to his clearly masterful
ability to volley questions posed at him. One comment: that Judge Roberts,
while making it explicit that he was acting in an employer-employee
relationship, nevertheless used the pronoun “our,” rather than an objective
description. Clearly, since Title IX’s enactment in 1972, the tether for the
statute’s application to eradicate sex discrimination was the provision of
federal funds to the schools. Federal funds came directly to colleges in the
form of revenue for research endeavors and indirectly through federal funds
provided to collegiate students explicitly to pay tuition costs at the colleges
and universities, which was a major part of the federal expenditure scheme.
Any checks issued—either by the federal government or by students for
tuition—were made payable to the particular college or university and not a
particular department. The whole tenet of Title IX was the voluntary
acquiescence by the recipient to accept the federal funding. Without access to
the particular memo, it is difficult to definitely assess if the nominee rejected
this, instead articulating a rather miserly approach by requiring “something
more solid” than student federal aid. For someone so attuned to this issue, to
be unable to definitely state what happened to the 1988 Restoration Act, which
occurred during the Reagan Administration, where President Reagan vetoed
the bill, rather than verbalizing “I believe, signed into law by the President” is
simply perplexing (even though the nominee had briefly ventured into private
practice at that juncture (May 1986–Oct. 1989), until being appointed as the
Principal Deputy Solicitor General in October 1989 during President George
H.W. Bush’s tenure. Moreover, the nominee would subsequently argue before
the Supreme Court in another Title IX case, NCAA v. Smith, which dealt with
the statutory addition to the law that embodied the directive from the
Restoration Act, where the nominee, in representing the NCAA, registered
another cramped but more logical, and successful, interpretation for what
constituted being a recipient of federal funds. One could transfer the earlier
sentiment into an argument that “something more solid” was needed to reign
in the NCAA from being saddled with Title IX oversight.
One gets the impression that then Attorney Roberts was a tenacious
advocate. What is interesting—aside from his mastery of recall as to the
intricacies involving cases and matters he worked on twenty years ago—is the
way he implicitly framed it from an athletic contest point148 in that he won,
147. Id. at 174–76 (emphasis added).
148. Id. See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 202, where the nominee opined,
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that he was, in fact, successful. Albeit from the Senate testimony, it was his
nature to be publicly modest about his extraordinary accomplishments rather
than exhibit a blustery type of approach.
2. Inquiry by Sen. Charles E. Grassley
Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) then picked up the baton regarding this
case, pointing out in that memo ascribed to the nominee:
Senator GRASSLEY: But Senator Kennedy left out what your
assessment was on it, and you wrote these words. “As a
practical matter, however, I do not think the administration
can revisit the issue at this late date.”
Can you tell us what your position was in this memo? And
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this entire memo
submitted for the record.149 [granted]
....
Judge ROBERTS. The issue was the—in the Grove City case,
the Court had said that receipt of financial aid by students
triggered coverage under the civil rights statutes, limited to
the admissions office, the admission policies. The Civil
Rights Restoration Act changed that result to say that the
limitation was not to the admissions office but applied more
generally to the institution.
Secretary [of Education] Bell submitted a proposal. He said,
well, if it’s going to apply more generally to the institution,
then the trigger of simply having students who receive
financial aid shouldn’t be enough. And the position that we
took in response to Secretary Bell’s proposal was no, that we
weren’t going to revisit it. We had argued earlier in Grove
City that financial aid was enough to trigger coverage and we
weren’t going to revisit that question. The position was that
coverage of the entire institution based on receipt of financial
aid was appropriate.150
Senator GRASSLEY. So Senator Kennedy’s words were not
quoting you but quoting words that Secretary Bell had in this
“Well, the Court got it right in each case.” (discussing some other cases).
149. Id. at 182. The memorandum, dated February 12, 1982, was not included as an exhibit in
the Hearing transcript.
150. Id. It was the holding of the Court regardless of whether it was appropriate or not.
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memo, and you were reacting to those.
Judge ROBERTS. Well, it’s, again, 23-some years ago. But
my recollection is that that was his proposal. Our response
was that, no, we’re not going to do that, we’re not going to
change the position we’ve taken in light of the new
legislation.
[Senator Grassley then went into a discussion of the Voting
Rights Act.]151
What about inquiring what the candidate’s current position was, as of
2005? Not surprisingly, the jurist again recited the issues that were confronted
in the case—as he had for Sen. Kennedy.
3. Exchange with Sen. Joseph Biden
But that was not the end of the discussion. There was a bit of partisanship
between both sides of the aisle. Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) also dived into
the pool with some preliminaries, followed by this exchange:
Senator BIDEN. The date of the memo was February 12,
1982. I will give you a copy, ask them to bring you down a
copy of the memo.
Judge ROBERTS. I can’t elaborate on—I can’t elaborate
beyond what’s in the memo. I just—
Senator BIDEN. Well, I hope you don’t still hold that view,
man. I mean, if the idea that you’re not going to—that a
conservative civil rights—the head of the Civil Rights
Division in the Reagan administration says it is pretty clear
Kentucky is discriminating against women in their prison
system,152 and you say, in effect, that may be but, look, we
shouldn’t move on it, I recommend we don’t do anything
about this, and the reason we shouldn’t do anything [about]
this is three-fold: one, private citizens already went ahead and
filed suit on this; number two, if, in fact, you go ahead and do
this, they may do away with the system [educational programs
provided to male prisoners] for the men because there’s [sic]
tight budgets—and I forget the third one. You now have the
memo.
151. Id. at 182–83.
152. See, e.g., Archer v. Reno, 877 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
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Judge ROBERTS. Well, I have the memo and see that one of
the areas that you mentioned I say that—and this is to the
Attorney General, and I say the reason we shouldn’t do this is
because “you have publicly opposed such approaches.” So,
again, it would have been—
Senator BIDEN. It was only his idea, then? I mean, you were
just protecting him so he wouldn’t be inconsistent?
Judge ROBERTS. I was a lawyer on his staff, and according
to this memorandum—and, again,
I don’t remember anything independently of this 23 years ago.
But the memorandum suggests, a staff lawyer to his boss, that
this is inconsistent with what you have said. And, again, I
guess I would regard that as good staff work rather than
anything else.
Senator BIDEN. I regard it as very poor staff work, with all
due respect, Judge, because it seems to me you insert your
views very strongly in here. You don’t say you said this. You
say, “And, by the way, there’s [sic] other reasons why we
shouldn’t do this. Assume you’re saying you wouldn’t go this
route before, but I want to give you more ammunition here,
Brad.153 Private plaintiffs have done this; it is inconsistent
with three themes in your judicial restraints effort: equal
protection claim, relief of a well-involved judicial inference,
et cetera; and, by the way, the end result may be with tight
budgets they may do away with this.”
My time is running out. I will come back to this. I hope you
get a chance to study it between now and the time we get back
153. The transcript did not specify a complete name for this individual. However, the Assistant
Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Justice Department during most of the
Reagan Administration was William Bradford Reynolds.
There was a memorandum from Mr. Roberts to “Brad Reynolds.” See National Archives News,
Records Pertaining to John G. Roberts, Jr. (Released on Sept. 2, 2005) (Files concerning William
Bradford Reynolds from 1981-1988) (Memorandum from John Roberts to Brad Reynolds, AAG Civil
Rights Division; Voting Rights Act; Internal Memos (Feb. 8, 1982) (Box # 14; Folder # 387),
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0172/001-Box14Folder387.pdf; University of California at Santa Barbara, Radio Address to the Nation on Civil Rights
(June 15, 1985), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38782#axzz1r
YVMVjoy (wherein President Reagan referred to “Brad Reynolds.” (Parenthetically, Judge Roberts
was appointed as Special Assistant by Hon. W. French Smith. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra
note 8, at 69. During the two-term Reagan Administration (Jan. 1981–Jan. 1989), Smith was
succeeded by Hon. Edwin Meese III, in 1985, who was succeeded by Hon. Richard L. Thornburgh,
U.S. Attorney General, during the George H.W. Bush Administration.).

HECKMAN_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

502

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

5/9/2012 1:54 PM

[Vol. 22:2

to the second round.154
Sen. Biden would nevertheless continue exploring this area with Judge
Roberts.
Senator BIDEN. The next question. You know, I find it
fascinating, this whole thing about Title IX and whether or not
by Title IX—you and I know what we are talking about, but
for the public at large who really has an interest in all of this
as well, the issue was whether or not when a student gets aid,
whether or not it only goes to the admissions piece of it.
Now, you said something that was accurate but I don’t think
fulsome to Senator Kennedy, and correct me if I am wrong.
You said, look, we were arguing that it did apply—Title IX
did apply. If a student got aid, it applied to the university.
That was one of the questions, whether or not you have no
application or a narrow application [to the educational
institution]. And you argued that it should apply to the
admissions process.
But there is a second issue in that case, and the second issue
is: Do you apply it narrowly only to do with the admissions
policy or do you apply it to if they are discriminating in
dormitories?155
I got your answer on the first part. You thought it should
apply, at least narrowly. Were you arguing that it should
apply broadly? And this was before—let me make it clear.
The district court, I say to my friends—because I had
forgotten this. The district court had ruled that this only
applies to admissions, and there was a question. The
Chairman of Reagan’s Commission on Civil Rights said we
should get in on the side of the plaintiff here, and we should
appeal this to the Supreme Court or to a higher court and say,
“No, no, this applies across the board, this applies if you don’t
put money in sports programs, you don’t put money in
dormitories, et cetera.”
What was your position on Reagan’s Civil Rights Chairman,
Clarence Pendleton, suggesting that we appeal the decision of
154. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearings, supra note 8, at 192–93.
155. Presumably, referring to a program-wide analysis.
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the circuit court narrowly applying it only to the admissions
office?
Judge ROBERTS. Senator, I was a staff lawyer. I didn’t have
a position. The administration had a position, and the
administration’s position was the two-fold position you’ve set
forth. First, Title IX applies. Second, it applies to the office,
the admissions office.
[Some interchange as to the answers supplied.] . . . .
Judge ROBERTS. –dispute that was 20-some years ago. The
effort was to interpret what this body, Congress, meant. The
administration position was Federal financial aid triggers
coverage. It’s limited to the admissions office. The United
States Supreme Court agreed on both counts.
Senator BIDEN. I understand that.
Judge ROBERTS. So I would say that the administration
correctly interpreted the intent of Congress in enacting that
legislation.
Senator BIDEN. Well, let me read what you wrote in that
memo. You said you “strongly agree.” Now, when my staff
sends me a memo saying, “Senator, I recommend you do the
following . . . and I strongly agree,” that usually is a pretty
good indication what they think. Now, maybe they don’t.
Maybe they just like to use the word “strongly.” They said
“strongly agree.” It usually means they agree. Number one.
Number two, you went on to say, and I quote, that if you have
the broad interpretation, it will be—the Federal Government
will be rummaging “willy-nilly through institutions.” So you
expressed not only that you strongly agree, but you thought
that if you gave them this power to broadly interpret it, to
apply to dormitories and all these other things, that they would
willy-nilly—they would rummage willy-nilly through
institutions.
It seems to me you had a pretty strong view back then.
Maybe you don’t have it now.
Judge ROBERTS. Well, and the Supreme Court’s conclusion
was that that the administration position was a correct reading
of the law that this body passed. So if the view was strongly
held, it was because I thought that was a correct reading of
the law. The Supreme Court concluded that it was a correct
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reading of the law.156
It is unknown why the document or documents were not initially provided
to the witness. The Chairman, a former trial attorney, should have required
that the witness be provided with any written memoranda discussed by the
senators. All this sturm und drang about events two decades ago. Sen. Biden
was attempting to elicit—albeit in his ubiquitous style157—Judge Roberts’
current sentiments. The part of “being able to do away with this” through
“tight budgets” was the most disturbing. It embodies a win at any cost
mentality. In other words, while a law may be on the books, if there is no
money to enforce the law, it is essentially toothless and thus de facto nonexistent. For example, if there are insufficient inspectors to inspect whether
meat from cows complies with U.S. Department of Agriculture standards, then
the regulations become de facto meaningless. Or, from a Title IX perspective,
if there is not sufficient money appropriated to the OCR, then it puts a strain
on administrative enforcement of the statute by the executive department and
specifically the U.S. Department of Education.
Remarkably, the Title IX matter would not rest. On September 14, 2005,
during the second day of questioning, Sen. Orren Hatch (R-Utah), a former
chair of the Judiciary Committee, would afford the witness an opportunity to
redress apparent criticism of his Title IX colloquy during the previous day:
Senator HATCH. Now, also yesterday the Democratic staff
of the Committee released a press release stating that you
failed to distance yourself from what it called your “earlier
cramped positions on Title IX and women’s rights.” . . . Now,
what assurance can you give the Committee that you will
fairly interpret the civil rights laws, including critical statutes
such as Title IX, fully and fairly, consistent with the purposes
Congress intended in passing these laws?
Judge ROBERTS. [essentially repeated what he had said in
his opening statement including that “I have no agenda,” and
distinguishing that his role as a judge differed from the role of
a “staff lawyer.”] I am now a judge, and I have had the
experience and I think my record will establish that that is
how I approach cases across the spectrum of issues that are
156. Id. at 193–94 (emphasis added).
157. Mark Leibovich, Speaking Freely, Sometimes, Biden Finds Influential Role, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2009, at 1, 16. (indicating that “they also acknowledge that the verbose vice president has
struggled to adjust at times to working within a White House that prizes discipline.”). As of March
2012, Vice President Biden has maintained a relatively low profile during the current administration.
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raised before the courts.158
From a semantics viewpoint, it could be argued that the term “cramped”
was a rather surprisingly bland word used for partisan politics, here adopted by
the Democratic Party to describe the judge’s unflinching and static verbiage.
Was that the best term the Democrats could muster? It hardly seemed
worthwhile to even call attention to the statement and bring it up. Again, the
witness deftly slid a fastball across the home plate without straining or getting
any dirt on his uniform. He kept to the mantra. The entire answer, such as it
was, voiced absolutely no mention of the words “Title IX” or “gender
discrimination.” Sen. Hatch continued with his questioning reminding the
audience that Attorney Roberts had ultimately advocated the correct position
in Grove City College.
Senator HATCH. So I find it strange to criticize you because
you won a case in the Supreme Court and have not advocated
against women’s rights in any way, shape, or form ever in
your career, as far as I can understand. Is that correct?
Judge ROBERTS. That’s correct, Senator.
Senator HATCH. And, in fact, you are a strong supporter of
women’s rights and gender equality?
Judge ROBERTS. Yes, Senator.159
It would have been interesting if there was an amplification by the
nominee on this particular area of support of women’s rights. No Democratic
senator picked up on this exchange to seek examples.
4. Alito’s Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing
The Senate hearings for his colleague, then Judge Samuel A. Alito, did not
explicitly focus on Title IX jurisprudence. However, Judge Alito had the
following general exchange during his Senate Judiciary Confirmation hearing,
which implicitly referred to Title IX [internal footnotes have been added for
informational purposes]:
Senator [Russell] FEINGOLD [D-Wis.]. Thank you, Judge.
158. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearings, supra note 8, at 310–11 (emphasis added). See supra text
accompanying notes 75–76 (Judge Roberts’ opening remarks).
159. Id. Sen. Coburn (R-Okla.)would mention Title IX and a pre-Grove City case, University of
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (utilizing a narrow approach), to also allude to
the witness supporting women’s rights. Id. at 399–400.
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Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation that
would protect gay students from harassment in schools that
receive Federal funding?
Judge ALITO. That would fall within the South Dakota v.
Dole160 standard, and the question would be whether the
condition that’s attached to the receipt of the Federal funds is
germane to the purpose of the funding, and that’s a standard
that gives Congress a very broad authority.
Senator FEINGOLD. So that Congress does have the
authority in general. The question would be the scope of it.
Judge ALITO. Congress has the authority to attach all sorts
of conditions to the receipt of Federal money. It has to be
clear so that the States understand what they’re getting into,
that if you take this money there are conditions that go with it,
but provided that that clear statement requirement is satisfied
and provided that the condition is germane to the purpose of
the funding, then Congress can attach conditions, and it could
do so in this area.161
Judge Alito did not identify either of the Title IX Supreme Court decisions
rendered in Gebser or Davis, which pertained to sexual harassment generally.
The discussion becomes significant due to the Rehnquist Court’s interpretation
of the extent of the Eleventh Amendment’s application, requiring that there be
an appropriate Fourteenth Amendment section five nexus to uphold the ability
160. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (sanctioning Congress’ imposition of a minimum drinking age of 21 in
connection with the distribution of federal highway funds, 23 U.S.C. § 158, as a valid use of
Congress’ Spending Powers, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.). See
Justice Alito’s decision in Arlington Central School District Bd. of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291, 296 (2006) (discussion of the Spending Clause with the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, as reauthorized by Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004), case addressing whether
compensation should be afforded expert witnesses), wherein the jurist almost reiterated verbatim his
Senate Judiciary Committee response, stating:
Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money to the
States, . . . but when Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds,
the conditions must be set out “unambiguously.” “[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power [of the U.S. Constitution] is much in the nature of a contract,” and
therefore, to be bound by “federally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal funds must
accept them “voluntarily and knowingly.” States cannot knowingly accept conditions of
which they are “unaware” or which they are “unable to ascertain.”

Id. at 296 (citations omitted) (referred to in Thro, supra note 30, at 497).
161. Alito’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 20, at 621.
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of federal legislation to allow citizens to sue state entities in federal courts –
and can arise where there is a federal-funding aspect to a federal statute (such
as with Title IX).
Judge Alito commented generally about discrimination, “‘[w]hen I get a
case about discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family who
suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or because of
religion or because of gender. And I do take that into account.’”162 Albeit,
one commentator stressed this Justice’s empathy was constrained, “[i]n
general, Alito has been no more likely to uphold civil rights claims than
Roberts, and only somewhat more likely than Scalia and Thomas.”163
V. OVERSIGHT OVER ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS: STRIKE THREE
“Generally, athletic associations have been buffered from Title IX
jurisdiction, as the associations did not directly receive federal funds.”164 In
NCAA v. Smith,165 the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the NCAA
was not a recipient of federal funds to bring it within Title IX jurisdiction
simply because its member schools received federal funds. As indicated,
Attorney Roberts successfully represented the NCAA in the appeal before the
Court. According to written testimony provided by then-Judge Roberts at his
Senate Judiciary Committee nomination hearings, as to his role in representing
the NCAA concerning its seeking a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court
and then upon its grant of the actual appeal, he wrote:
The issue on the merits was what it meant to “receiv[e]
Federal financial assistance,” under the terms of the statute.
On behalf of the NCAA, we argued that according to Supreme

162. Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice: What Drives Samuel Alito, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20, 2011, § 6 (Magazine), at 14 (referring to his 2006 confirmation hearings). This author opined,
“By operating one case at a time, rather than from a grand vision, Alito has proved himself to be the
closest thing conservatives have to a feeling justice.” Id. at 13. The article found that:
Alito’s sense of empathy . . . rarely extends to people who are not like him. Alito [who
authored the majority decision] had no kind words for Lilly Ledbetter, for example, who
for almost 20 years was paid less than the men doing the same job she held as a
supervisor at Goodyear Tire and Rubber. In 2007, he wrote the 5–4 decision turning
away Ledbetter’s sex-discrimination suit because she didn’t go to court soon enough; she
didn’t know about the pay discrepancy until years later.

Id. at 14 (referring to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (addressing
Title VII litigation)).
163. Id.
164. Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 4, at 570 n.82.
165. Smith, 525 U.S. 459.
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Court precedent, coverage under the statute is limited to direct
recipients of federal funding—those who knowingly entered
into a bargain by accepting the funding. In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court
agreed with this position and reversed the Third Circuit.166
Judge Roberts amplified:
We argued in our briefs that the Supreme Court had
developed a contract theory of coverage with respect to
legislation, such as Title IX, enacted pursuant to Congress’
Spending Clause powers. Under that theory, entities that
knowingly and voluntarily accept federal funding are subject
to the restrictions that come with it.
The necessary
implication of this theory is that coverage under the statute is
limited to direct recipients of the funding – those who
knowingly entered into a bargain by accepting the funding –
and does not “follow [] the aid past the recipient to those who
merely benefit from the aid.”167
As Judge Roberts noted, “[t]he Court explained that, at most, the NCAA’s
‘receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal
assistance afforded its members. This showing, without more, is insufficient
to trigger Title IX coverage.’”168 The Supreme Court would agree with his
position. The hearings contained no discourse as to role of Attorney Roberts
representing the NCAA and the effect of this decision on female studentathletes subject to the rules and regulations of the most important athletic
association nationally.
During the confirmation hearings, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) had
inquired about the Spending Clause:
Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me ask you. Do you believe
that State obligations created by Congress through the
Spending Clause are enforceable by citizens in the courts?
Judge ROBERTS. Well, the answer there is it depends on that
law. In Gonzaga what the Court determined was that [the]
provision at issue there was not enforceable by private citizens
166. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 78 (written response).
167. Id. at 105.
168. Id. (citing Smith, 525 U.S. at 468).
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in the courts. It was enforceable by the Federal Government.
The Federal Government can cut off the funds. More likely,
the Federal Government can enforce the provision through
proceedings against the university.
In the Wilder case, a different statute, the Court determined
the condition in that case, the Medicare—or Medicaid funding
case was enforceable, a private citizen could go into court
because the review of Congress’ intent in that case came out
differently than it did in the Gonzaga case.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Well, let me just finish this
quickly. I am not a lawyer and I don’t really know how to ask
this question, but let me try. When is it a contract and when is
it the law? Because if it is a contract, that affects a whole host
of laws that we pass that are very important—Medicaid, Title
IX, No Child Left Behind, even the Internet Protection Act, all
of these things. So when does a contract attach?
Judge ROBERTS. It’s always a contract, and sometimes if
the intent of Congress is that private parties be allowed to sue,
it’s more than a contract. But it’s always at least a contract.
Senator FEINSTEIN. So the intent has to be a specific intent.
Judge ROBERTS. It doesn’t—no, the courts don’t require
that. They don’t require that you specifically say you have the
right to sue. But the Court has to look at it and try to figure
out did you intend—when you put this provision in, did you
intend private parties to be able to sue for damages? Or did
you expect the Department of Education to enforce that and
have the authority to cut off the funds or to impose other
conditions because a university is violating it? And as I’ve
said, some cases come out one way, and some cases come out
the other way. But in each of those cases, what the Court is
trying to do is figure out what you, the Congress, meant in
that statute.169

169. Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 430 (emphasis added) (referring to
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (addressing the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2000) [hereinafter FERPA] (providing confidentiality as to certain
school records) (finding there was no § 1983 private right of action for students to claim violation of
the FERPA statute; thus, it would be up to the Department of Education to ameliorate any
violations)). Presumably, the second case being referred to was Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,
496 U.S. 498 (1990) (also involving the Spending Clause and a challenge to the Medicaid Act
program). See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280 (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)).
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Too bad none of the senators inquired as to whether the jurist also
supported the Court’s decision in Cannon, allowing a citizen to go forward to
safeguard his or her Title IX rights, rather than having to rely solely on the
Department of Education, which due to policy or monetary reasons, could be
restricted in its enforcement of the statute.
Near the end of the questioning of the witness, there was an exchange
among Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), Sen. Feinstein, Chairman Spector and
Judge Roberts, precipitated by Sen. Schumer’s inquiry as to what type of
judge the witness would be if elevated to the highest court.
Senator SCHUMER. . . . Will you be a truly modest,
temperate, careful judge in the tradition of Harlan, Jackson,
Frankfurter and Friendly? Will you be a very conservative
judge who will impede congressional prerogatives but who
does not use the bench to remake society like Justice
Rehnquist? Or will you use your enormous talents to use the
Court to turn back a near century of progress and create the
majority that Justices Scalia and Thomas could not achieve?
This is the question that we on the Committee will have to
grapple with this week. . . .
Judge ROBERTS. . . . And, Senator Schumer, I don’t think
you can read those [50 Circuit Court] opinions and say that
these are the opinions of an ideologue. You may think they’re
not enough. You may think you need more of a sample. That
is your judgment. But I think if you’ve looked at what I’ve
done since I took the judicial oath, that should convince you
that I’m not an ideologue, and you and I agree that that’s not
the sort of person we want on the Supreme Court.170

VI. POSTSCRIPT
On January 21, 2009, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, the
Roberts Court rendered its first Title IX-related opinion, concluding that the
170. Id. at 442–43. See Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court’s Helm, But He Isn’t Yet in
Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 2, 22–23.
His goal of inspiring the court to speak softly and unanimously seemed a distant
aspiration as important cases failed to produce majority opinions and members of the
court, including occasionally the chief justice himself, gave voice to their frustration and
pique with colleagues who did not see things their way.

Id. at 2.
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Title IX statute does not preempt § 1983 claims171 based on the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.172 The case concerned peer sexual
harassment alleged by a female kindergarten student against the Massachusetts
public school she attended based on the actions of a male third-grade student
that purportedly occurred on a frequent basis on a school bus over a number of
months. The student’s parents, who were dissatisfied with the public school’s
proposed solutions to the situation, instituted suit against the school committee
responsible for the public school based on Title IX and also sought relief based
on the Fourteenth Amendment through use of § 1983. Rather than Chief
Justice Roberts electing to write this opinion, he instead passed the assignment
to Justice O’Connor’s successor, Justice Alito. The Court delivered a
unanimous opinion.173 The previous day, Sen. Biden was sworn in as Vice
President of the United States.174 On March 23, 2009, the Court declined to
hear the appeal in Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education,175
concerning whether the elimination of intercollegiate teams at James Madison
University, a NCAA Division I college, violated Title IX.
During May 2009, Justice Souter announced his intention to retire from
the Court upon the induction of a successor.176 Later that year, Congress
approved President Barack Obama’s first nominee to the Supreme Court,
Circuit Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor, a member of the Second Circuit Court
and the first Latina-American. Her Senate confirmation hearings focused on
other topics. Justice Sotomayor has not presently participated in any Title IX
cases. During April 2010, Justice Stevens, the Court’s oldest jurist, made
public his intention to retire at the end of the 2009–2010 term (which ended on
June 28, 2010). President Obama nominated U.S. Solicitor General Elena
Kagan.177 Her Senate confirmation hearing took up four days commencing on
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights).
172. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm. 555 U.S. 246 (2009). See Diane Heckman, Fitzgerald
v. Barnstable School Committee: The Supreme Court and the Axis of Section 1983, Title IX and the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Seeking Redress of Education-Related Sexual
Harassment, 246 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Heckman, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School
Committee] (examining, in detail, this case and the surrounding legal issues).
173. See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246.
174. See Zeleny, supra note 71.
175. 291 F. App’x 517 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1127
(2009).
176. See Editorial, Justice Souter Departs, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, § 4 (week in review), at 9
(stating, “Abiding commitment to core constitutional values is precisely what Justice Souter . . . has
demonstrated in his 18 years on the court.” The editorial also underscored, “Justice Souter went on to
become a reliable champion of civil rights.” Id.).
177. President Clinton had previously nominated Ms. Kagan, another Harvard Law School
graduate, who was involved as a counsel with his White House, to a federal judge position, but the
congressional confirmation hearings were never scheduled. The first two days of the Senate Judiciary
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June 28, 2010. The lackluster hearings, based on inquires posed, concerned no
questions directed toward Title IX. The Senate Judiciary Committee voted
favorably on Solicitor General Kagan’s nomination, and she was sworn in as
the Court’s fourth female Justice on August 7, 2010. One commentator
opined that Justices Sotomayor and Kagan “have quickly become a formidable
duo on the court’s left flank, with the promise to serve as a 21st-century
version of Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan.”178 The 2010–2011 term
marked the fifth term of the Roberts Court, deemed the most conservative
court in decades,179 with “[f]our of the six most conservative justices of the 44
who have sat on the court since 1937 . . . serving now: Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and, most conservative of all, Clarence
Thomas.”180
On the legislative side, as indicated, Sen. Biden became Vice President of
the United States. Sen. Kennedy died during August 2009.181 Sen. Spector,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee from 2005–2007, changed his longstanding party affiliation (from Republican to Democrat), in 2009, and then
lost a primary race that year to seek re-election for his Senate seat in
Pennsylvania. Sen. Feingold lost his 2010 campaign for re-election. Sen.
Brownback left the U.S. Senate in 2011 to become the Governor of Kansas.
VII. CONCLUSION
Forty years of Title IX jurisprudence before the Supreme Court has
centered on threshold and jurisdictional issues as to whether individuals can
pursue routine discriminatory claims against certain entities (Cannon, North
Committee hearings (June 28–29, 2010) were not directed to any specific discussion of Title IX. The
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).
178. Emily Bazelon, Chamber of Pain: The Next Few Years of Supreme Court Rulings Could Be
Brutal for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, § 6 (Magazine), at 9 [hereinafter Bazelon, Chamber of
Pain].
179. Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, supra note 21, at 1. See also Jeff Shesol,
Evolving Circumstances, Enduring Value, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at 14 (regarding STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010)), stating
[B]reyer and the court’s liberals . . . are up against the most assertive and, let’s just admit
it, activist bloc of conservatives in modern memory. According to a recent analysis, even
the right-leaning justices of the 1930s – the ‘Four Hourseman’ who tried to derail the New
Deal – are moderates, when compared with John Roberts, Samuel Alito et al.

180. Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, supra note 21, at 18. See also Bazelon,
Chamber of Pain, supra note 178, at 9 (“And with the left already outnumbered five to four on the
Roberts court, liberals are feeling no small amount of trepidation heading into this period, as if the
basic tenets of compassionate governance could be brought low.”).
181. See EDWARD M. KENNEDY, TRUE COMPASS (2009) (memoir).

HECKMAN_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/9/2012 1:54 PM

BATTER UP

513

Haven, Grove City College and Smith) or claims involving sexual harassment
(Gebser and Davis), or retaliation (Jackson) and if so, can compensatory
damages be awarded (Franklin). It is somewhat fitting that Justice O’Connor,
the first female member of this august group, is the jurist to author the most
Title IX Supreme Court opinions. A review of the last four pre-Roberts Court
decisions demonstrated the strong block (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy) in the cases of Gebser, Davis,
Smith and Jackson, to restrict or temper Title IX’s applicability—even where
causes of action were allowed to proceed. With the departure of Justice
O’Connor, a tempered judicial supporter of the statute, albeit with tough
parameters, and the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, a non-supporter of broad
application to Title IX, it now awaits the tenure of the two new men and two
new women on the bench.182 The hearings for Justice Alito were devoid of a
substantive discussion of Title IX, and he had not participated in any of the
underlying intermediate appellate court reviews for Title IX cases that
marched through the Third Circuit Court (Grove City College and Smith).
Likewise, the hearings for Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were not predicated
upon discussions of Title IX.183
During September 2005, Judge Roberts, with all his intellectual acumen,
was still regurgitating backpay remedies for students pursuant to Title IX—
despite the Court explicitly rejecting this argument—without any internal
reconfiguring or recalibration as a result of the Franklin opinion. The thenfifty-year-old jurist could not recall the exact trajectory of the Restoration Act
and could not identify the exact standard used for Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause second-tier sex discrimination claims, while he knew
the standards for the first and third tier ones. His unequivocal strong advocacy
against Title IX as a government and private attorney can be added to the
equation. Even the Solicitor General for the George W. Bush administration
supported the plaintiff’s position in Jackson184 that Title IX allowed for a
retaliation cause of action for the coach when he was speaking out for
purported lack of gender equity for his student-athletes. To use the baseball
metaphor, if Judge Roberts was the pitcher and Title IX the hitter, based on
what occurred during his nomination hearings pertaining to his litigation
career, Title IX struck out swinging on three pitches. With the addition of the
182. See generally Linda Greenhouse, The Roberts Court, Version 4.0, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2010, § 4 (week in review), at 10.
183. See Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan Has Sparse Record on Education,
NSBA LEGAL CLIPS (May 20, 2010), http://legalclips.nsba.org/?m=2010&w=20.
184. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jackson v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672), 2004 WL 1900496. See Heckman, Deconstructing
Title IX Sexual Harassment, supra note 47, at 22.
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Court’s new Chief Umpire, certainly not inclined to like anything about the
statute based on his fossilized congressional testimony evidencing his thoughts
about his actions as an attorney, it will be interesting to see what occurs in the
future. When the next Title IX case comes before the Court, rather than the
customary opening words “Oyez, Oyez, Oyez,” the session will start with
“Batter up,” and sitting behind the bench will be the Chief
Umpire. Time will tell what the dimensions of the batter’s box are for the
Title IX players in the Roberts Court.185

185. See supra text accompanying note 171. Presently, the Roberts Court did not grant any
petitions for writs of certiorari to address Title IX during his inaugural term (2005–2006), and the first
full term without Justice O’Connor (2006–2007). During the next term (2007–2008), the Court
agreed to hear the appeal in the Title IX-related case Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, and
on January 21, 2009, the Court issued its decision. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246 (unanimously ruling that
Title IX did not preempt a Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim,
finding the statute was not comprehensive). See Heckman, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School
Committee, supra note 172. See also Equity in Athletics, 291 F. App’x 517 cert. denied, 556 U.S.
1127 (2009) . There were no other grants of certiorari involving Title IX cases during the 2010–2011
term.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. Summary of Pre-Roberts Court’s Title IX Decisions

1

Name of Case
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
411 U.S. 677 (1979)
(reversing and remanding Seventh
Circuit)

Decision

Author

Subject Matter

(7–2)

Stevens

affording a private right of action
(student) generally to remedy
Title IX violations
upholding the constitutionality of
the Title IX regulations (Subpart
E\) governing employment

2

North Haven Sch. Bd. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512 (1982)
(affirming and remanding Third Circuit)

(6–3)

Blackmun

3

Grove City Coll. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 555 (1984)
(affirming Third Circuit)

(7–2)

White

narrow interpretation as to the
receipt of federal funds element

4

Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Public Schs.,
503 U.S. 60 (1984) (9-0) 186
(reversing Eleventh Circuit)

(9–0)

White

allowing monetary damages as a
remedy for intentional violation
of the statute

5

Gebser v. Lago Indep. Vista Sch. Dist.,
524 U.S. 274 (1998) (affirming Fifth
Circuit)

(5–4)

O'Connor

affording a cause of action
against educational institutions
based on teacher-student sexual
harassment

6

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith,
525 U.S. 459 (1999)
(vacating and remanding Third Circuit)

(9–0)

Ginsburg

indirect receipt of federal funds
by an entity is not sufficient to
render Title IX jurisdiction

7

Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999)
(reversing and remanding Eleventh
Circuit)

(5–4)

O'Connor

affording a peer sexual
harassment cause of action
against the educational institution

8

Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,
544 U.S. 167 (2005)
(reversing Eleventh Circuit)

(5–4)

O'Connor

affording educational employees
a retaliation cause of action

186.
Although this was a unanimous decision, Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion
reluctantly agreeing with the judgment, joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. A
certain pattern emerged, as Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas, formed the stalwart block in four subsequent Franklin cases limiting or restricting Title
IX, even though they were in the majority position. See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; NCAA v. Smith, 525
U.S. 459; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Jackson, 544 U.S. 167.
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